Weight restrictions on geography variables in the DEA benchmarking model for Norwegian electricity distribution companies by Bjørndal, Endre et al.
  
 
 
SNF Report No 33/08 
Weight Restrictions on Geography Variables in the DEA 
Benchmarking Model for Norwegian Electricity 
Distribution Companies 
Endre Bjørndal, Mette Bjørndal and Ana Camanho 
 
 
 
SNF Project No 7085  
”Vektrestriksjoner i normkostnadsmodellen for distribusjonsnettselskapene i Norge” 
 
The project is financed by the Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate 
(NVE) 
 
 
INSTITUTE FOR RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION 
BERGEN, DECEMBER 2008 
  © Dette eksemplar er fremstilt etter avtale 
  med KOPINOR, Stenergate 1, 0050 Oslo. 
  Ytterligere eksemplarfremstilling uten avtale 
  og i strid med åndsverkloven er straffbart 
  og kan medføre erstatningsansvar. 
  
 
ISBN 978-82-491-0620-2 Trykt versjon 
ISBN 978-82-491-0621-9 Elektronisk versjon 
ISSN 0803-4036 
  
 
Summary 
We examine weight restrictions in the DEA model for distribution networks, taking as the 
starting point the NVE model with one input, total cost, and several outputs. In the 
unrestricted DEA models, we notice large differences in absolute and relative shadow 
prices, and for some companies, extreme weight on “geography” variables in the cost 
norms. There seems to be a tendency that companies with a large weight on geographic 
variables and / or a low weight on transported energy and customers become super 
efficient. This seems unreasonable, and one remedy may be to restrict prices / weights for 
individual outputs, or combinations of outputs. We consider absolute, relative and virtual 
weight restrictions, and show how to formulate the LP problems and how to interpret the 
restrictions. We discuss the relative price restrictions suggested for geography and high 
voltage variables by NVE (2008), and consider an alternative approach, using virtual 
weight restrictions on the combination of the three geography variables; forest, snow, and 
coast. Comparing the effects of the virtual approach to the relative, we notice that with 
relative weight restrictions, more companies are affected, but to a lesser extent. An 
important task when introducing weight restrictions in the DEA analyses is to determine 
the specific limits on the weights. Finding reasonable limits, depends on which type of 
weight restrictions that are considered, and should be based on knowledge of cost and 
technology in the industry. An advantage of the virtual weight restrictions is that they are 
on a more aggregated level than the relative ones, and it may be easier to establish limits 
on the overall effects on the total cost norm from a subset of outputs, rather than 
reasonable pair-wise comparisons of outputs weights. Finally, the report discusses 
implementation of DEA models with weight restrictions, and gives a short overview of 
available software.  
  
 
  
 
Table of Contents 
1. Introduction ........................................................................................................ 1 
2. The DEA model for benchmarking distribution companies .......................... 4 
2.1 Model specification .................................................................................................................................. 4 
2.2 Efficiency scores ...................................................................................................................................... 6 
2.3 Marginal values of outputs – output weights ............................................................................................ 9 
2.4 Summary .................................................................................................................................................17 
3. Weight restrictions ........................................................................................... 18 
3.1 Absolute weight restrictions ....................................................................................................................20 
3.2 Relative weight restrictions .....................................................................................................................21 
3.3 Virtual weight restrictions .......................................................................................................................23 
3.4 Summary .................................................................................................................................................24 
4. Weight restrictions proposed by NVE ........................................................... 25 
4.1 The proposal ............................................................................................................................................25 
4.2 Evaluation and reformulation of the geography restrictions ....................................................................26 
4.3 Effects of relative restrictions ..................................................................................................................33 
4.4 Summary and conclusions .......................................................................................................................38 
5. Alternative methods: Virtual weight restrictions ......................................... 39 
5.1 Why virtual weight restrictions? ..............................................................................................................39 
5.2 Evaluation of alternative weight restrictions ...........................................................................................41 
5.3 Weight restrictions and reference companies ..........................................................................................50 
5.4 Which companies are punished – one or several geography factors? ......................................................56 
5.5 Summary and conclusions .......................................................................................................................59 
6. Determination of limits .................................................................................... 60 
6.1 Shadow prices and degeneracy ................................................................................................................60 
6.2 Information about prices or cost ..............................................................................................................61 
6.3 Summary .................................................................................................................................................68 
7. Other implementation issues ........................................................................... 69 
8. Conclusions ....................................................................................................... 71 
References ............................................................................................................. 73 
 
  
 
SNF Report No 33/08 
 
1 
 
1. Introduction 
In the Norwegian electricity sector, network companies are regulated by means of a 
yardstick model. Annual revenue caps are determined for individual companies based on 
a combination of actual cost and cost norms, according to the following formula: 
KKKKKIR )1()( **   , 
where IR is the revenue cap, K is the actual cost, K
*
 is the cost norm, and    [0,1] is a 
factor that specifies the strength of the incentives in the yardstick model, i.e. the weight 
that is attributed to the cost norm. For 2007 and 2008,  is equal to 0.5, however, it is 
supposed to increase to 0.6. Actual cost and cost norms are updated annually, although, in 
practice, due to accounting procedures and the need for securing the quality of the data, 
there is a time lag in the application of cost data. At present (since 2007) the cost data 
used for calculating actual cost and analyzing relative efficiency is 2 years, i.e. the input 
for calculating cost data and performance for year t, is data from year t-2. 
More specifically, actual total company cost K estimated for year t consists of a 
combination of registered and calculated costs, based on accounting values in year t-2. 
Operation and maintenance costs (OM) from year t-2 are adjusted for inflation (KPI), 
depreciation (DEP) equals the accounting values in year t-2, while network losses (NL) 
are found by taking the losses in MWh in year t-2 and multiplying by an average area 
price (collected from Nord Pool Spot) for year t. The cost of capital is found by 
multiplying the book value (BV) of the company assets at 31.12 in year t-2 by the NVE 
rate of return, rNVE. This regulated rate of return is determined annually, based on a risk 
free rate of return and a risk premium. Finally, the value of lost load (VOLL) is added to 
the cost base. VOLL is calculated as lost load times a price, with different prices for 
various customer groups. 
For distribution companies and regional transmission companies, the cost norm, K
*
, is 
calculated based on relative efficiency scores found by DEA (Data Envelopment 
Analysis). There are separate DEA models for distribution functions on the one hand and 
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regional transmission / central grid functions on the other hand
1
. The applied DEA 
models are cost efficiency models with CRS (constant returns to scale) and a single input 
equal to total cost K, i.e. both operating and capital expenditures are included in the 
performance evaluations. A variant of super efficiency is implemented such that 
efficiency scores may be higher than 100 % (a company that performs better than the 
other companies and improves over time). When evaluating relative efficiency with 
DEA, average (industry) efficiency will depend on implementation details like for 
instance the number of evaluated companies (the size of the data set), the number and 
specific choice of outputs, assumptions about scale efficiency, and whether super 
efficiency is modeled or not. In order to secure efficiency improvements over time and an 
attractiveness of the industry to investors and employees, it is important that particularly 
efficient companies can earn more then the normal rate of return. Thus, the efficiency 
scores are calibrated such that the representative company earns the normal rate of return. 
Since 2007, the representative company is the averagely efficient company, and 
consequently, the efficiency numbers found from the DEA analyses are calibrated such 
that the cost weighted average efficiency score is 100 % (Bjørndal and Bjørndal (2006b) 
and NVE (2006ab)). This also implies that K = K**, where K** is the calibrated / 
normalized cost norm. 
Finally, due to the time lag in the use of accounting data, new investments must be 
compensated in order to earn the normal rate of return in a representative company. This 
is accomplished through an adjustment parameter, JP (this parameter and its use is 
discussed in Bjørndal et al. 2008
2
). The formula for establishing the revenue of a 
company in year t can then be written as: 
JPKKEJPKKIR tttttt   22
*
22
**
2 )1()1(   
where 2tK  is the price adjusted cost base from year t-2, 
*
2tE  is the calibrated efficiency 
score of the company, and ** 2tK  is the corresponding calibrated cost norm. 
                                                 
1
 Also for Statnett, the system operator and main owner of the Central grid, revenue is regulated. Statnett is 
also benchmarked relative to other European system operators (ECOM / ECOM+). 
2
 In Bjørndal et al. (2008) we discuss the combined effect of normalization of efficiency scores and 
adjustment parameter for new investments, and that the compensation for time lags is taken back in a 
second calibration procedure. In this report we will not discuss this issue any further. 
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The DEA model used for efficiency analyses has a single input equal to total cost, but 
many outputs, that can be interpreted as cost drivers. Some of the outputs are “product 
attributes”, like delivered energy and the number of customer connections. However, 
others are exogenous or endogenous factors that are included in order to take into account 
differences in the “degree of difficulty” in providing network services in various license 
areas. Some of these outputs are in fact input factors, and in general they are “proxies” 
for environmental or geographic cost drivers related to customer density, topology, 
weather conditions, and similar. After the introduction of the new regulation model from 
2007, it has been a worry that non-product outputs are allowed too large weights in the 
analyses, and that the consequence is overcompensation of companies that are “unusual” 
(having few peers to compare with) rather than efficient. 
In this report, we discuss methods to alleviate this problem, with special focus on weight 
restrictions on “geography” factors in the DEA model for distribution networks. In 
section 2 the DEA model for distribution networks is described, and applied to industry 
data from 2005 and 2006. In section 3 we describe different versions of weight 
restrictions, and what interpretation they may have in a DEA model with cost as the only 
input factor. In section 4 we outline the restrictions proposed by NVE (2008), and we 
evaluate and suggest a revised version of those restrictions that are related to the 
geography variables. In section 5 we propose alternatives, and we compare them to the 
restrictions in the NVE proposal. In section 6 we discuss how to determine the specific 
limits on weights, and in section 7 we touch upon some implementation issues, including 
available software. Finally, conclusions and recommendations are found in section 8.  
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2. The DEA model for benchmarking distribution companies 
2.1 Model specification 
For distribution companies, the efficiency scores for year t are estimated using an input-
oriented CRS model with data from year t-2
3
. The model has total cost, including capital 
costs, as the only input, and 9 output variables, as shown in figure 2.1 below. 
Variable Unit of measurement 
Energy delivered MWh 
Customers (except 
cottages) 
No. of customers 
Cottage customers No. of customers 
High voltage lines Kilometers 
Net stations 
(transformers) 
No. of stations 
Interface 
Cost weighted sum of equipment in the interface between the 
distribution network and the regional transmission network 
Forest 
Proportion (0-100) of area with high-growth forest × HV-lines 
through air (kilometers) 
Snow 
Average precipitation as snow (mm) × HV-lines through air 
(kilometers) 
Coast 
Average wind speed (m/s) / Average distance to coast (meters) 
× HV-lines through air (kilometers) 
Figure 2.1: Output variables of the DEA model 
The output variables do not, with the exception of energy delivered and the number of 
customers connected, measure direct outputs from the production activity of the 
distribution companies, but rather represent structural and environmental conditions that 
may influence the cost of the companies. Three of the variables (HV-lines, net stations, 
and interface) are in fact input variables. Their role in the DEA model, however, is to 
                                                 
3
 NVE uses an average over several years to represent the VOLL cost in their DEA analyses. For the 2008 
revenue limit calculations, the average is taken over the years 2003-2006. However, final efficiency scores 
for inefficient companies, i.e. those with an efficiency score of less than 100 %, are adjusted to reflect the 
actual VOLL cost in year t-2. In practice this is done by replacing average VOLL cost with the actual 
VOLL cost for year t-2, and then recalculating the efficiency score for each company. Although this 
adjustment can have a significant effect on the efficiency scores of individual companies, the effect is not 
systematic, and we have therefore chosen to use the average VOLL cost in our calculations. 
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represent demographical and topological conditions, as well as transmission functions, 
that influence the costs of a particular company, and for which a better representation 
could not be found. The last three variables (forest, snow, coast) describe environmental 
conditions that may influence the cost of the companies, and are the only variables that 
are not based on data reported by the companies. 
The selection of output variables was one of the most challenging issues when the new 
regulation model was developed prior to its introduction in 2007. In NVE (2006a), the 
regulator formulated three criteria that should be met if an output variable was to be 
included in the model: Firstly, the variable should have a solid “theoretical and practical” 
foundation. Secondly, it should have a statistically significant effect on company costs in 
SFA model test, as well as on the DEA efficiency in OLS regression tests. Thirdly, the 
variable should also be statistically significant in the so-called “Banker test”, see Banker 
(1993). Hence, although a large number of candidate variables were considered initially, 
the final set of variables was determined mainly based on statistical tests. For example, a 
variable representing low voltage lines was rejected based on the Banker test, whereas the 
high voltage line variable passed the test and is included in the model. Since the statistical 
correlation between the two variables is high, this may seem quite unproblematic. 
However, since the companies to some extent will view the two types of lines as 
substitutes, the omission of one of them on the output side of the model may tilt the 
investment incentives of the companies in favor of the other one. The fact that the DEA 
model to some extent is “incomplete”, i.e., that relevant output variables have been 
omitted because they are correlated with variables that are included, must be taken into 
account when considering relative weight restrictions such as in NVE (2008). We will 
come back to this issue in section 5 where we propose virtual weight restrictions as an 
alternative to the relative restrictions in NVE (2008). 
Companies are allowed to be super efficient, i.e. efficiency scores may exceed 100 %. In 
order to avoid very high efficiency scores, super efficient companies are re-evaluated 
against a data set from the year(s)
4
 preceding t-2. The DEA model in the second step 
includes data for the company itself, hence a company can only appear as super efficient 
if it has improved its performance relative to the previous year(s). In this report, we only 
                                                 
4
 For 2007, which was the first year of the new regulation model, the second step DEA analyses were based 
on data from 2004. For 2008, the second step used average data from 2004-2005. 
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consider the DEA analyses performed in the first step, i.e., a super efficiency model 
based on data from year t-2. 
2.2 Efficiency scores 
In figure 2.2 we have plotted the efficiency scores for 2005 and 2006, and we see that for 
the 127 companies in the data sets
5
 the efficiency scores lie in the range between 60 % 
and 140 %, with a cost weighted industry average somewhat above 90 %. We also notice 
that, although the efficiency scores for individual companies in the two years seem to be 
highly correlated, there is considerable variation from one year to another. 
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Figure 2.2: Efficiency scores for 2005 and 2006 
In figures 2.3-2.7 we show that the effects on the efficiency scores from introducing 
geography variables as outputs are considerable. This is so for each variable, as well as 
the combined effect. 
                                                 
5
 There are 134 and 136 companies in the data sets for 2005 and 2006, respectively, but we have omitted 
some of them because of data quality issues. The omitted companies constitute less than 1 % of the total 
cost base for the industry. 
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Figure 2.3: Total effect from geography outputs – forest, snow, coast (name shown if 
effect is at least 20 %-points) 
 
Figure 2.4: Effect of forest variable (name shown if effect is at least 15 %-points) 
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Figure 2.5: Effect of snow variable (name shown if effect is at least 15 %-points) 
 
Figure 2.6: Effect of coast variable (name shown if effect is at least 15 %-points) 
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Without 
geography With forest With snow With coast
With all 
geography var.
Weighted average 89.8 % 91.1 % 91.5 % 91.2 % 93.6 %
Simple average 82.8 % 85.5 % 86.2 % 86.0 % 91.5 %  
Figure 2.7: Average effects of geography variables 
2.3 Marginal values of outputs – output weights 
Looking at the shadow prices of the outputs for different companies, we notice huge 
differences from one company to another. This is true both for the absolute prices, for the 
relative prices, and for the combined effect of prices and outputs on the objective 
function (the total cost norm). 
Absolute price levels 
In figure 2.8 we present some statistics for the output prices or weights. For a particular 
output, its price or weight can be interpreted as the marginal change in the company’s 
cost norm
6
, given that the company increases its output quantity by one unit. When 
calculating the cost norms in the DEA model for each individual company, weights are 
chosen such that the efficiency of the company is made as high as possible, given some 
restrictions
7
. In general, it will tend to be beneficial for a company to choose high 
weights for outputs of which it has relatively much, and low weights for other outputs. 
Figure 2.8 shows that the variation in observed weights among the companies is indeed 
very large. For example, the average weight per customer in 2006 was NOK 510, less 
than 1/5 of the maximum weight! We also see that many of the weights are equal to zero, 
which is related to the existence of slack. A company with a weight of zero for a 
particular output will normally have slack with respect to that output, i.e. the company 
produces less than the reference company. Thus, it is possible to produce more of the 
output (than the reference company does) without changing the total (minimized) cost, 
and slack can be interpreted as a “hidden” inefficiency, in the sense that it is not 
measured by the efficiency score of the company. 
                                                 
6
 In the EMS software used by NVE, the output weights are normalized, and can be interpreted as the 
marginal effect of an output increase on the company’s efficiency score. 
7
 See the mathematical formulation in Section 3. 
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2005 2006 2005 2006 2005 2006
Energy 21 32 93 92 68 48
Customers 605 510 2 343 2 671 73 82
Cottage customers 1 531 1 165 7 848 7 264 67 69
HV-lines 4 864 8 735 32 457 44 683 88 63
Net stations 15 979 12 896 45 769 52 548 50 59
Interface 1 174 1 300 7 032 7 701 69 51
Forest 29 284 28 184 222 056 215 491 44 57
Snow 18 445 24 193 109 824 123 595 73 58
Coast 22 847 22 700 148 469 165 919 82 81
Average (NOK) Max (NOK) No. of zeros
 
Figure 2.8: Output weights (shadow prices) for 2005 and 2006 
Relationship between prices 
Comparing shadow prices on one output to the shadow prices on a different output, we 
notice also that the relative prices vary a lot. Figure 2.9 illustrates this for the Forest 
variable and the output variable High Voltage (HV) lines. Each point represents a 
company, and for some companies Forest has the highest price, while for others it is the 
HV variable. Moreover, many companies have a shadow price of zero for at least one of 
the outputs, indicating slack. 
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Figure 2.9: Shadow prices on Forest and High Voltage lines 
Virtual weights 
In order to assess the relative impact of the different outputs on the cost norms, we note 
that the cost norm of a company can be obtained by multiplying all its output quantities 
with the corresponding shadow prices or weights, and summing over the outputs. An 
example for Trollfjord Kraft, based on 2006-data, is shown in figure 2.10. There are four 
outputs with positive weights, and the five other ones have positive slack and zero 
weights. Note that Trollfjord Kraft has nothing of the interface output, so even though 
this output has a positive weight, it has no influence on the cost norm of Trollfjord Kraft. 
The total cost norm is 31.97 MNOK, and since the reported cost is 26.58 MNOK, the 
efficiency score of this company will be 120.3 % (= 31.97 / 26.58). Coast and energy are 
the most important output parameters for the company, making up 43.8 % and 42.5 % of 
the cost norm, respectively, while snow accounts for the remaining 13.7 %. The product 
of an output quantity and its weight is sometimes referred to as the virtual output 
quantity, and the corresponding percentage weight is called the virtual output weight, see 
Thanassoulis et al. (1987). 
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Physical 
quantity Slack
Weight 
(NOK)
Cost norm 
(1000 NOK)
Share of 
cost norm
Energy 147 367.0 92.1 13 580 42.5 %
Customers 4 670.0 596.1
Cottage customers 494.0 431.3
HV-lines 348.0 68.6
Net stations 287.0 41.4
Interface 0.0 905.4 0 0.0 %
Forest 101.6 512.0
Snow 136 382.9 32.1 4 375 13.7 %
Coast 22.3 627 772.6 14 019 43.8 %
Sum 31 973 100.0 %  
Figure 2.10: Computation of cost norm for Trollfjord Kraft (2006) 
In figure 2.11 we show the composition of the cost norm for all the companies in the 
industry. Each column in the figure corresponds to one company, and since the width of 
the column is equal to the cost norm for the company, the area of the entire graph is equal 
to the total cost norm for the industry. The virtual output weights for the industry are 
given in brackets, and we see that energy and customers together constitute 59 % of the 
total cost norm for the industry. The geography variables, on the other hand, account for 
only 10 % of the norm, which may not seem very dramatic.
8
 However, some companies 
have very high virtual weights for these three variables, as the 10 % are distributed on 
many small companies that represent a relatively small share of the total industry cost, 
but with large individual virtual weights. 
                                                 
8
 This does not mean that the industry cost norm increases by 10 %-points when the geography variables 
are introduced. As shown in figure 2.3 and 2.7, many companies are affected, but average efficiency in the 
industry increases from 89.8 % to 93.6 %, i.e. the cost norm increases by 3.8 %-points. 
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Figure 2.11: Virtual output weights for 2006 
Figure 2.12 show companies with a virtual weight of more than 50 % on the geography 
variables. There are 13 such companies, and we see that some of them are highly super 
efficient (efficiency scores are shown in brackets). For these 13 companies, more than 
half of the cost norm will be determined by the geography variables. Although it is 
clearly difficult to distinguish between reasonable and unreasonable weights, we think 
that many will agree that the examples shown in figure 2.12 are unreasonable. Figure 
2.13 shows companies with a weight of less than 10 % on energy and customers. There 
are 21 such companies, and again we see that some of these have very high efficiency 
scores. 
In the 2006 data, 31 companies are super efficient, and 12 of them are represented in 
figures 2.12 and / or 2.13. Similarly, figure 2.14 shows all companies with efficiency 
scores of at least 110 % in 2006. There are 16 such companies, and 8 of these can also be 
found in figure 2.12 and/or figure 2.13, i.e., companies with extreme weights seem to be 
over-represented in the group of highly super efficient companies. This points towards a 
link between very high efficiency scores and extreme output weights, and this tendency is 
confirmed in figures 2.15 and 2.16, which show the relationships between virtual weights 
on geography variables and energy / customers on the one hand, and efficiency scores on 
the other hand. We notice that a larger virtual weight on geography variables tends to 
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give higher efficiency scores, while it is the opposite for companies with large weight on 
the energy and customer variables. 
 
Figure 2.12: Companies with more than 50 % weight on geography (2006) 
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Figure 2.13: Companies with less than 10 % weight on energy/customers (2006) 
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Figure 2.14: Companies with efficiency scores of more than 110 % (2006) 
 
 
Figure 2.15: Efficiency and geography variables (2006) 
SNF Report No 33/08 
 
17 
 
 
Figure 2.16: Efficiency and energy/customers (2006) 
2.4 Summary 
The examples in figures 2.11-2.16 show that extreme weights may be a problem in the 
present DEA model for the distribution companies, and that this phenomenon to a certain 
degree may explain the occurrence of very high efficiency scores. In the following 
sections, we look at possible remedies for this problem. In the DEA literature there exist 
several methods for handling the problem of extreme input/output weights. The most 
prominent method is to impose restrictions on the weights or shadow prices in the DEA 
model, and in the following we concentrate on different types of weight restrictions. 
However, other methods do exist, such as adjusting the data set by adding artificial data 
points, or adjusting DEA efficiency scores for slack. An overview of the different 
methods can be found in Thanassoulis (2004). 
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3. Weight restrictions 
Generally, in DEA, the efficiency of a company is defined as the ratio of a weighted sum 
of outputs to a weighted sum of inputs. When computing the efficiency, there is complete 
freedom to choose the weights associated with each input and/or output so as to 
maximize the relative efficiency of the company. This complete flexibility in the 
selection of weights is especially important for identifying inefficient companies, as the 
DEA formulation demonstrates that these companies cannot achieve the maximum 
efficiency score even when they can choose the weights that show them in the best 
possible light. 
However, the complete flexibility may result in some inputs and/or outputs being 
assigned a zero or negligible weight, meaning that these factors are in fact ignored in the 
efficiency assessment. Moreover, the weights may vary a lot from one company to 
another, and they may be in conflict with a priori beliefs about relative weights or rates of 
substitution. One way to limit the range of values that the weights can take is to use 
weight restrictions. Literature reviews on the use of weight restrictions in DEA can be 
found in Allen et al. (1997) and Thanassoulis et al. (2004). 
Several types of weight restrictions have been proposed in the DEA literature. In this 
section we explain different versions of weight restrictions, and their interpretation in the 
DEA modeling framework. Our starting point is the DEA model specified for Norwegian 
distribution networks, as outlined in the previous section. Thus, our focus is on weight 
restrictions that fit into a cost efficiency model with a single input, total cost, and a 
number of outputs, consisting of product characteristics, like energy transported and the 
number of customers served, and environmental/geography variables, to account for the 
difficulty of providing network services in different concession areas
9
. The resulting 
DEA model for evaluating a specific company can be formulated as a linear program, 
either with an objective function that minimizes the efficiency score, or one that 
minimizes cost, thus establishing the corresponding cost norm for the evaluated 
company. We formulate the min cost variant in the following, in order to obtain a dual 
formulation with weights / prices that can be interpreted in monetary units. 
                                                 
9
 See Dyson and Thanassoulis (1988) for a discussion of the single-input model. 
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A linear program for determining the cost norm of company j
*
 is: 
(LP1)  
 *
Min
jj
jj x

   
s.t.   
*
*
rj
jj
rjj yy 

   r = 1,...,s    
0j    j = 1,...,n   
There are n companies producing s different outputs. The total cost of company j is xj 
while company j produces yrj units of output r. The variable j is the weight of company j 
in the reference set of the evaluated company j
*
. The model is CRS (with constant returns 
to scale, j  0) and we assume super efficiency (sum over j except j
*
). The interpretation 
of the linear program is that in the performance evaluation of company j
*
 we find the 
reference company, as a linear combination of the other companies in the industry, with 
minimum cost, such that it produces at least as much of each output as the evaluated 
company. 
Alternatively, we may formulate the dual problem of LP1: 
(LP2)  
r
rjrjp
py **Max    
s.t 
j
r
rjrj
xpy  *   j  j*    
0* rjp    
The decision variables are the prices prj* for each output of the evaluated company, and 
the linear program can be interpreted so as to find prices for company j
*
 that maximize 
revenue, and at the same time assure that none of the other companies exceed their total 
cost at these prices (they are within a budget limit). The prices prj* in problem LP2 are the 
shadow prices of the output constraints in LP1, and consequently, prj* gives the increase 
in minimum cost due to an increase in yrj*, and is a local per unit cost of output r. 
Except for the budget constraint and the non-negativity constraints in LP2, there is 
complete freedom in choosing the shadow prices in the dual problem LP2. This may 
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result in prices that are in contradiction to prior views or additional information. It may 
for instance be that the prices of different outputs turn out to be illogical. With slack in 
the inequality constraints in LP1, the corresponding shadow prices in LP2 will be equal 
to zero, and as a consequence, the minimum cost can be determined more or less 
completely by the weights of only a few outputs. 
One possible solution to problems with the values of the weights is to limit the values that 
the prices can take in LP2. There are different versions of such weight restrictions, both 
restrictions on absolute prices and on the relationships between prices are possible. 
Moreover, it is possible to introduce restrictions on the products of prices and quantities. 
In the following we will show how weight restrictions can be formulated in the primal 
and dual LP problems of a benchmarking model of the NVE type, and we will give 
interpretations of the restrictions that we put on the weights. 
3.1 Absolute weight restrictions 
Absolute weight restrictions are upper or lower bounds on the absolute values of the 
shadow prices in LP2. Let us consider absolute weight restrictions on the shadow price of 
output k, i.e. 
  UPkkj
LO
k CpC  *  
These restrictions can be included in the dual program LP2, to give the following, more 
restricted linear program: 
(LP3)  
r
rjrjp
py **Max    
s.t. 
j
r
rjrj
xpy  *   j  j*   )( j  
UP
kkj
Cp *      )(
UP
k  
LO
kkj
Cp  *      )(
LO
k  
0* rjp   
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Introducing more restrictions into the maximum problem, the weight restrictions on the 
shadow prices of output k will have a non-positive effect on the optimal objective 
function value, i.e. the cost norm will be reduced (or stay the same), and the weight 
restrictions lead to stronger efficiency requirements. This is intuitive when we look at the 
effect on the corresponding primal cost minimization problem (taking the dual of LP3), 
with decision variables j , 
UP
k , and 
LO
k , the latter two being the shadow prices of the 
added weight restrictions in LP3. 
(LP4)  LOk
LO
k
UP
k
UP
k
jj
jj CCx 


 *
,
Min    
s.t. 
*
*
kj
LO
k
UP
k
jj
kjj yy 

    
*
*
rj
jj
rjj yy 

     r  k  
0,, LOk
UP
kj     
From LP4 we see that an interpretation of the restrictions on the absolute value of the 
shadow prices of output k, is that it is possible to buy and sell output k at prices UPkC  and 
LO
kC , respectively. In other words, the peers of the evaluated company can either produce 
output k itself or engage in an external market, buying UPk  and selling 
LO
k  at 
prespecified prices UPkC  and 
LO
kC . This can also be interpreted as introducing another 
peer (the external market) that can provide output k at price UPkC  per unit and take care of 
any surplus at price LOkC  per unit. 
3.2 Relative weight restrictions 
Relative weight restrictions limit the relationship between shadow prices of different 
outputs. Let us consider relative weight restrictions on the shadow prices of outputs l and 
m, i.e. 
  *** mj
UP
lmljmj
LO
lm pCppC   
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These restrictions can be included in the dual program LP2, to give the following, more 
restricted linear program: 
(LP5)  
r
rjrjp
py **Max    
s.t. 
j
r
rjrj
xpy  *    j  j*   )( j  
0**  mj
UP
lmlj
pCp      )( UPlm  
0**  mj
LO
lmlj
pCp      )( LOlm  
0* rjp   
Once more, introducing more restrictions into the maximum problem, the weight 
restrictions on the shadow prices of outputs l and m will have a non-positive effect on the 
optimal objective function value, i.e. the cost norm will be reduced (or stay the same), 
and the weight restrictions lead to stronger efficiency requirements. This is intuitive when 
we look at the effect on the corresponding primal cost minimization problem (taking the 
dual of LP5), with decision variables j , 
UP
lm , and 
LO
lm , the latter two being the shadow 
prices of the added weight restrictions in LP5. 
(LP6)  
 *
,
Min
jj
jj x

   
s.t. 
*
*
lj
LO
lm
UP
lm
jj
ljj yy 

  
*
*
mj
LO
lm
LO
lm
UP
lm
UP
lm
jj
mjj yCCy 

    
*
*
rj
jj
rjj yy 

 , mlr ,  
0,, LOlm
UP
lmj     
An interpretation of the relative weight restrictions is that additional to the production by 
the reference companies, it is possible to substitute outputs l and m in fixed proportions, 
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given by C
UP
 and C
LO
. It is for instance possible to obtain a unit of output l by giving up 
UP
lmC  units of output m. 
3.3 Virtual weight restrictions 
Virtual weight restrictions limit the value of the virtuals, i.e. the product of the output 
variable and its shadow price. Let us consider a virtual weight restriction on output k. 
This takes the form of restricting the share that output k contributes to the total cost norm 
of company j
*
 in the objective function of the linear program LP2: 
10,******   UPkLOk
r
rjrj
UP
kkjkj
r
rjrj
LO
k CCypCypypC  
These restrictions can be included in the dual program LP2, to give the following, more 
restricted linear program: 
(LP7)  
r
rjrjp
py **Max  
s.t. 
j
r
rjrj
xpy  *     j  j*   )( j  
0****  
r
rjrj
UP
kkjkj
ypCyp      )( UPk  
0****  
r
rjrj
LO
kkjkj
ypCyp     )( LOk  
0* rjp   
Again, introducing more restrictions into the maximum problem, the virtual weight 
restrictions on output k will have a non-positive effect on the optimal objective function 
value, i.e. the cost norm will be reduced, and the weight restrictions lead to stronger 
efficiency requirements. Also in this case, it is possible to investigate the effect on the 
corresponding primal cost minimization problem by taking the dual of LP7, with decision 
variables j , 
UP
k , and 
LO
k , the latter two being the shadow prices of the added virtual 
weight restrictions in LP7. 
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(LP8)  
 *
,
Minimer
jj
jj x

 
s.t. 
***
*
)1()1(
kjkj
LO
k
LO
kkj
UP
k
UP
k
jj
kjj yyCyCy 

  
kryyCyCy
rj
jj
rj
LO
k
LO
krj
UP
k
UP
krjj 

,*
*
**   
0,, LOk
UP
kj     
Also in this case, the effect is some sort of substitution possibility that is introduced in the 
cost minimization, giving new feasible solutions, and thus having a non-positive effect on 
the value of the objective function, compared to the unrestricted LP1. It is also possible to 
restrict not only the virtual of a single output, but the combined effect on the objective 
function of several outputs. This is discussed further in section 5. 
3.4 Summary 
In the DEA literature a variety of different restrictions on shadow prices / weights are 
described. For the DEA model that NVE is using for distribution networks, with a single 
input equal to total cost, and various outputs, the most relevant weight restrictions are 
absolute and relative weight restrictions, restricting the absolute values or relative values 
of shadow prices, as well as virtual weight restrictions, restricting the effect that one or a 
combination of outputs can have on the cost norm. Relative weight restrictions will be 
considered in section 4, where we evaluate and revise some of the proposed restrictions 
in NVE (2008), while an alternative approach based on virtual weight restrictions is 
proposed and evaluated in section 5. Restrictions with respect to absolute levels of the 
weights do not seem natural in the case of the geography variables, and will not be 
considered in this report. They may be useful in the case of other variables, such as 
delivered energy and customers served, and restrictions on these variables will be the 
subject of a later report. 
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4. Weight restrictions proposed by NVE 
In this section we will discuss some of the relative weight restrictions proposed by NVE 
(2008). The entire proposal is presented in section 4.1, together with a brief discussion of 
the motivation for the different restrictions, as stated in the NVE report. In section 4.2 we 
evaluate the restrictions with respect to the geography variables, and we suggest a revised 
formulation of these. Among the changes that we propose is a redefinition of the 
geography variables in order to make the variables and their weights more easily 
interpretable, thereby facilitating the formulation of weight restrictions. Then, in section 
4.3 we evaluate the effects of the revised restrictions, and section 4.4 gives a summary 
and conclusions. 
4.1 The proposal 
The restrictions proposed in the NVE report are shown in figure 4.1 below. They are all 
of the relative type, and are based on pair-wise comparisons of output weights. 
Restrictions VR1-VR8 are two-sided, thereby providing both upper and lower bounds for 
the involved weights, while restrictions VR9-VR11 are one-sided, and form an upper 
bound for the geography weights based on the weight of HV-lines. 
Restriction(s) Involved variables Mathematical formulation 
VR1 / VR2 HV-lines versus net stations NSHVNS ppp 572.8952.0   
VR3 / VR4 Interface versus net stations NSIntNS ppp 20738.002304.0   
VR5 / VR6 Customers versus cottage customers  CustCCustCust ppp 33/1   
VR7 / VR8 Net stations versus customers CustNSCust ppp 252.58618.1   
VR9 Forest versus HV-lines HVForest pp 04.0  
VR10 Snow versus HV-lines HVSnow pp 0053.0  
VR11 Coast versus HV-lines HVCoast pp 364.36  
Figure 4.1: Weight restrictions in NVE (2008) 
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The various restrictions have different motivations. According to the report, restrictions 
VR1-VR8 are introduced in order to reduce slack in the DEA-model, while the 
motivation behind VR9-VR11 is to avoid unreasonably high efficiency scores as a result 
of the geography variables. As we discussed in section 2, high efficiency scores may in 
some cases reflect extreme weighting of outputs rather than real efficiency, and weight 
restrictions can clearly be used to eliminate such weighting schemes. Hence, the 
motivation behind VR9-VR11 seems plausible. We find the motivation behind VR1-
VR8, i.e., to reduce slack, somewhat more problematic. It is indeed true that slack in a 
DEA analysis represents a form of “hidden” inefficiency. By choosing zero weights for 
some outputs, companies may be able to weight their “preferred” outputs more heavily, 
thereby obtaining higher efficiency scores. In this sense, the existence of slack is 
connected to the problem of “unreasonable” efficiency scores. However, eliminating 
slack does not in itself solve the problem of unreasonable weighting schemes / efficiency 
scores. Note that, in order to eliminate slack for an output, it is enough to force the 
corresponding weight to be strictly positive. However, the resulting weight may still be 
very low relative to other output weights, and may be seen as highly unreasonable. 
Hence, in order to evaluate the DEA weights of a particular company, it is not enough to 
check whether the values of the weights (slacks) are positive or not, one needs to look at 
the actual values of the various weights and conclude whether they represent a plausible 
weighting scheme or not. An interesting example of such an evaluation can be found in 
Thanassoulis et al. (1987), who introduce the concept of “well-rounded performance” as 
an additional check on a company’s efficiency score, meaning that the efficiency rating 
“is based fairly evenly on all its outputs and inputs”. 
Another concern with respect to VR1-VR8 in the DEA model for distribution networks is 
that some of the output variables are input factors, like for instance HV-lines, net stations, 
and interface. For these variables, it can even be argued that the existence of slack should 
be seen as positive, since it indicates that the evaluated company uses less of an input 
than the reference company. For these outputs, it is not obvious that one should seek to 
reduce slack! 
4.2 Evaluation and reformulation of the geography restrictions 
The restrictions VR9-VR11, shown in figure 4.1 above, relate the geography weights to 
the weight on HV-lines. The intention behind them is to limit the weight of each one of 
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the geography variables to twice the weight of HV-lines. As stated in section 4.1, we find 
the motivation behind these restrictions plausible, but we have some objections to the 
details of their formulation, and this has mainly to do with the scaling factors that are 
applied to the left and right hand sides of the restrictions in order to make the geography 
weights and the weight of HV-lines comparable. We argue that some errors are 
introduced via this scaling procedure, and we therefore propose an alternative 
formulation. We scale the output quantities of the DEA model in order to make them 
comparable, thereby avoiding the scaling of output weights. A positive side effect of our 
modified proposal is that the output quantities for the geography variables become easier 
to interpret, thereby making the DEA model more understandable. 
Restrictions VR9-VR11 in NVE (2008) are formulated as one-sided restrictions, whereby 
an upper limit for the geography weights are specified relative to the weight on HV-lines. 
An interesting question is whether one should also specify lower limits for these weights, 
since some companies may be able to obtain unreasonably high efficiency scores by 
assigning very low weights to the geography variables. In the following, however, we 
will limit the discussion to the restrictions proposed by NVE (2008). 
Forest versus HV-lines (VR9) 
The forest variable of company j is defined as  
jjj,Forest eLinesAirHighVoltagxForestIndey  ,    (4.1) 
where the forest index measures the share of the company’s area that is covered by high-
growth forest (0-100), and HV-lines are measured in no. of kilometers. Based on this 
variable definition, NVE (2008) proposes the weight restriction 
HVForest pp 22/100  ,        (4.2) 
which is equivalent to 
HVForest pp 04.0 .        (4.3) 
The weight of HV-lines on the right hand side of (4.2) is multiplied by 2 in order to limit 
the weight of the forest variable to at most two times the weight of HV-lines. The factor 
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100 on the left hand side is introduced in order to adjust for the fact that forest index 
values are numbers between 0-100, and the division by 2 is made because air cables 
account for roughly 50 % of the high voltage network in Norway. We do not agree with 
the latter adjustment, since output weights represent marginal values. The marginal value 
of the last kilometer of “forest line” should be compared to the marginal value of the last 
kilometer of “normal” HV-line, and it is therefore wrong to adjust the weights based on 
the average composition of the network. Since the division by 2 on the left hand side is 
equivalent to multiplying by 2 on the right hand side, the proposed restriction is indeed 
much weaker than what was intended. 
In order to simplify the restriction, we propose instead to rescale the forest variable in the 
following manner: 
jjj,Forest eLinesAirHighVoltag/xForestInde:y  100 .  (4.4) 
By dividing by 100, the forest index can be interpreted as the fraction of the company’s 
area with high-growth forest, and hence the redefined variable can be interpreted as the 
number of kilometers of lines exposed to high-growth forest. Hence, the forest variable 
will have the same unit of measurement as the HV-line variable, and the weight 
restriction can be simplified to: 
HVForest pp 2 .  (4.5) 
Snow versus HV-lines (VR10) 
The snow variable of company j is defined as  
jjj,Snow eLinesAirHighVoltagSnowIndexy  ,  (4.6) 
where the snow index measures the average precipitation as snow (in millimeters per 
year). The weight restriction in NVE (2008) is formulated as 
HVSnow pp 22/757  ,  (4.7) 
which is equivalent to 
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HVSnow pp 0053.0 .  (4.8) 
The weight of HV-lines on the right hand side of (4.7) is multiplied by 2 in order to limit 
the snow weight to two times the value of the weight on HV-lines. The number 757 on 
the left hand side is the maximum amount of snow precipitation, where the precipitation 
number has been adjusted by multiplying it by the proportion of air cables in the 
company’s high voltage network. The division by 2 on the left hand side is made for the 
same reason as in (4.2), i.e. because air cables account for 50 % of the Norwegian high 
voltage network. We believe this adjustment should be rejected for the same reason as in 
the case of the forest variable. 
We propose a similar reformulation of the snow variable as in the case of the forest 
variable. The snow index is rescaled to a number between 0 and 1, by dividing by the 
maximum observed value (and without correcting for the proportion of air cables in the 
company’s network): 
j
MAX
j
j,Snow eLinesAirHighVoltag
SnowIndex
SnowIndex
:y    (4.9) 
The new snow variable can be interpreted as the number of kilometers of maximally 
snow exposed HV-lines. Given the re-definition of the snow variable, the corresponding 
weight restriction can be written as 
HVSnow pp 2 ,  (4.10) 
assuming that we want to use the restriction ratio equal to 2, proposed by NVE (2008). 
Coast versus HV-lines (VR11) 
The coast variable of company j is defined as  
jjj,Coast eLinesAirHighVoltagCoastIndexy  ,  (4.11) 
where the coast index is defined as average wind speed divided by average distance to 
coast. The corresponding weight restriction in NVE (2008) is formulated as 
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HVCoast p/.p 22110  ,  (4.12) 
which is equivalent to 
HVCoast p.p 36436 .  (4.13) 
The weight of HV-lines on the right hand side of (4.12) is multiplied by 2 in order to 
limit the coast weight to two times the value of the weight on HV-lines. The number 0.11 
on the left hand side is the maximum amount of the coast index, where the index has been 
adjusted by multiplying it by the proportion of air cables in the company’s high voltage 
network. The division by 2 on the left hand side is made for the same reason as for the 
forest and snow weight restrictions in (4.2) and (4.7), and should be rejected for the same 
reasons as explained earlier. 
We rescale the coast variable in a similar manner as for the snow variable in (4.9), by 
defining
10
 
j
MAX
j
j,Coast eLinesAirHighVoltag
CoastIndex
CoastIndex
:y  ,  (4.14) 
which can be interpreted as the number of kilometers of maximally exposed, with respect 
to coastal factors, HV-lines. The corresponding weight restriction then becomes 
HVCoast pp 2 .  (4.15) 
Effect of reformulation 
Note that the rescaling of the output variables, as defined by (4.4), (4.9) and (4.14), does 
not in itself change the DEA results. This is illustrated by figure 4.2 below, where we 
compare the efficiency scores based on the original data set (horizontal axis) and the 
corresponding efficiency scores based on the rescaled geography variables (vertical axis). 
As we can see from the figure, the two formulations are equivalent. However, the output 
weights of the geography variables are affected, as illustrated by the table in figure 4.3. 
                                                 
10
 As for the snow variable, we have computed the maximum coast index value based on unadjusted index 
numbers, and not as in NVE (2008). 
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The average value of the forest weight has increased by a factor of 100, which is exactly 
the factor that we have used to scale the new forest variable in (4.4). The average value of 
the snow weight with the original data set was NOK 20.27, whereas the average value 
with the reformulated data set is NOK 24 139, i.e., the value has increased by a factor of 
1193.6. This factor corresponds to the maximum observed value of the snow index
11
, i.e., 
the value that we used to define the new snow variable in (4.9). The coast weight has 
increased by a factor of 0.1611, which corresponds to the maximum observed value of 
the coast index
12
, i.e., the value used to define the new coast variable in (4.14). 
 
Figure 4.2: Effect of reformulation on efficiency scores – unrestricted model (2006) 
                                                 
11
 Observed index value for Odda Energi AS. 
12
 Observed index value for Tafjord Kraftnett AS. 
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Old New Old New Old New
Energy 32 32 92 92 48 48
Customers 510 510 2 671 2 671 82 82
Cottage customers 1 165 1 165 7 264 7 264 69 69
HV-lines 8 735 8 735 44 683 44 683 63 63
Net stations 12 896 12 896 52 548 52 548 59 59
Interface 1 300 1 300 7 701 7 701 51 51
Forest 282 28 184 2 155 215 491 57 57
Snow 20 24 193 104 123 595 58 58
Coast 140 948 22 700 1 030 215 165 919 81 81
Average (NOK) Max (NOK) No. of zeros
 
Figure 4.3: Effect of reformulation on output weights (2006) 
Figure 4.3 above shows that the average weight of HV-lines in 2006 is NOK 8 735, while 
the average weights of the geography variables are approximately 2.5 to 3 times as large. 
Hence, using a factor of 2 in the relative weight restrictions, as given by (4.5), (4.10) and 
(4.15), will clearly have an effect on the DEA results. This is also apparent from the 
diagrams in figure 4.4 below, where we have plotted the observed combinations of the 
unrestricted geography weights (vertical axes) and HV weights (horizontal axes). The 
solid lines in the diagrams indicate the relative weight restrictions given by (4.5), (4.10) 
and (4.15), and we see that a large number of the observed combinations of weights 
violates the proposed restrictions. We would therefore expect the restrictions to affect a 
large number of companies. 
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Figure 4.4: Unrestricted output weights with rescaled data (2006) 
4.3 Effects of relative restrictions 
Figure 4.5, where we have plotted the efficiency scores corresponding to the original and 
revised NVE proposal, as well as the unrestricted efficiency scores, illustrates that the 
revised version of the NVE restrictions will indeed affect a large number of companies, 
as was expected. Figure 4.6 gives a list of the 15 companies for which the efficiency 
score is reduced most, and we see that for the companies that have a reduction in 
efficiency of at least 10 %-points, most companies, with two exceptions, would have 
been evaluated as (very) super-efficient given the unrestricted model. 
2x 
2x 
2x 
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Figure 4.5: Effect of original and revised proposal (2006) 
 
Company Unrestricted Restricted Reduction
Rødøy-Lurøy Kraftverk AS 137 102 35
Nesset Kraft AS 120 91 29
Tysnes Kraftlag PL 108 81 28
Modalen Kraftlag BA 117 91 25
Fusa Kraftlag 128 103 25
Austevoll Kraftlag BA 83 66 17
Evenes Kraftforsyning AS 144 129 16
Trollfjord Kraft AS 120 106 15
Fitjar Kraftlag BA 93 80 13
Tydal Kommunale Energiverk KF 110 98 12
Ørskog Energi AS 123 112 10
Finnås Kraftlag 90 82 9
Indre Hardanger Kraftlag AS 99 91 8
Nordvest Nett AS 100 93 8
Fjelberg Kraftlag 71 64 7  
Figure 4.6: The 15 most affected companies, based on efficiency scores (2006) 
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Figure 4.5 also illustrates another interesting point, namely, that the revised version of the 
restrictions in the NVE proposal has a stronger effect on the efficiency scores than the 
original version. This is due to the adjustment made by NVE (2008) to account for the 
fact that air cables only account for 50 % of the high voltage network. This adjustment is 
based on an erroneous argument, and has therefore been removed in our revised version. 
Since the adjustment was made by dividing the left hand side of the restrictions (4.2), 
(4.7) and (4.12) by 2, its effect was to weaken the restrictions, and removing it will 
therefore result in stronger restrictions. Figure 4.7 compares the effect of the original 
restrictions proposed by NVE (horizontal axis) to restrictions on the reformulated data set 
(vertical axis). With the reformulated data set, we have used a ratio of 4 in the 
restrictions, i.e., the geography weights are bounded upwards by 4 times the weight of 
HV-lines. We see that the efficiency scores for the two formulations are nearly
13
 identical 
for most companies. Hence, the restrictions proposed by NVE roughly correspond to 
using a restriction ratio equal to 4 in the weight restrictions, i.e., they are in fact much 
weaker than what is stated in the proposal. 
                                                 
13
 The differences are due to the fact that the maximum values of the snow and coast indices, used to scale 
output weights in the NVE proposal and output quantities in the case of our reformulation, are not identical. 
In NVE (2008) the maximum values of the snow and coast indices are calculated with respect to adjusted 
index values, where the indices are multiplied by the proportion of air cables in the individual company 
networks. In our reformulation, we have not made any adjustments when calculating the maximum snow 
and coast index values, as we think this is neither necessary nor correct. 
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Figure 4.7: Effect of reformulation on efficiency scores – restricted model (2006) 
The choice of the restriction ratio equal to 2 in our revised version of the NVE proposal is 
consistent with the original proposal. However, when making this choice, one needs to 
interpret the geography weights correctly. Note that HV-lines exposed to one of the 
geography factors are counted twice in the output data. Firstly, they are counted by the 
HV-variable, and secondly, by the relevant geography variable. Suppose, e.g., that we 
would like to limit the value of one kilometer of forest-exposed HV-line to twice the 
value of one kilometer of non-exposed HV-line. Considering the double counting of 
forest-exposed lines, the correct restriction with respect to the forest weight should 
be HVHVForest ppp 2 , which is equivalent to 
 HVForest pp  ,  (4.16) 
i.e., corresponding to a ratio of 1 in the weight restriction. This is a considerably stronger 
requirement than the ratio of 4 implied by the original proposal in NVE (2008). 
If one chooses to implement relative restrictions of this type, the final choice of this ratio 
should be based on further analyses of the companies’ cost structure. The sensitivity 
analysis shown in figure 4.8 illustrates some of the effects that this choice may have. We 
have analyzed seven different cases, with a restriction ratio ranging from 0 to 5, as well 
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as the unrestricted case. Note that a limit ratio of 0 is equivalent to the case where the 
geography variables are not included in the DEA model. We see that for all the analyzed 
cases, the average (cost-weighted) industry efficiency does not vary much. When the 
restriction ratio is increased, fewer companies will experience very large reductions, but 
the number of affected companies does not decrease dramatically. Even with a restriction 
ratio of 3, 81 of the 127 companies are affected, and the average reduction for these 81 
companies will be 3.7 percentage points (using a simple average). Compared to the 
virtual weight restrictions that we shall look at in the next section, the efficiency 
reductions caused by the relative weight restrictions seem to be spread out over a fairly 
large number of companies. 
0x 1x 2x 3x 4x 5x Unrestr.
89.8 % 91.5 % 92.4 % 92.8 % 93.0 % 93.2 % 93.6 %
115 103 91 81 79 78 0
9.7 6.9 5.0 3.7 2.7 2.3 -
Over 50 2 1 0 0 0 0 0
25 - 50 8 4 4 0 0 0 0
10 - 25 29 15 7 7 6 3 0
 5 - 10 22 22 14 6 3 5 0
 0 -   5 54 61 66 68 70 70 0
No change 12 24 36 46 48 49 127
Corr(Eff, VirtualGeography) - -0.15 -0.02 0.10 0.17 0.20 0.32
Corr(Eff, PhysicalGeography) -0.43 -0.24 -0.10 0.00 0.05 0.07 0.16
Corr(Eff, VirtualProducts) 0.00 -0.04 -0.09 -0.13 -0.15 -0.15 -0.18
Maximum geography weights relative to HV-weight
Industry efficiency
No. of affected comp.
Average reduction
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Figure 4.8: Sensitivity analysis w.r.t. choice of restriction ratio (2006) 
In section 2 we showed that the unrestricted efficiency scores are positively correlated 
with the virtual weight on geography, and negatively correlated with the virtual weight on 
the product variables energy / customers. The correlation coefficents shown in the lower 
part of figure 4.8 illustrate that this correlation will be affected by the introduction of 
relative weight restrictions. The correlation between efficiency and the virtual geography 
weight decreases when the restrictions are tightened, and eventually becomes negative. 
Zero correlation occurs for a restriction ratio of between 2 and 3. Note that, since the 
virtual weights are optimized for each company in order to evaluate the company in the 
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best possible light, we may overestimate the correlation effect by using virtual geography 
weights. Therefore we also show correlation coefficients between efficiency scores and 
the physical value of the geography variables
14
, and this analysis shows a similar effect of 
the weight restrictions. Figure 4.8 also shows that the correlation between efficiency 
scores and the virtual weight on the product variables increases as the restrictions are 
tightened. Zero correlation in this case is obtained only when the geography variables are 
removed from the model, i.e., the restriction ratio is set equal to zero. 
4.4 Summary and conclusions 
In this section we have discussed the relative weight restrictions proposed in NVE 
(2008). We find the restrictions on the geography variables plausible and have suggested 
a reformulation, in section 4.2, of the data set in order to make the geography variables 
and their weights easier to interpret. With the revised data set, the geography weight 
restrictions can be formulated more easily. We showed, in section 4.3, that the revised 
restrictions are much stronger than the restrictions of the original proposal, due to an 
erroneous adjustment in the original restrictions. Finally, we performed some sensitivity 
analyses with respect to the restriction ratios, and one of the conclusions was that the 
relative restrictions seem to affect a large number of the companies in the industry, even 
when the ratios are high. The sensitivity analyses also show that the correlation effects 
discussed in section 2 will be influenced by the introduction of weight restrictions. 
Note that we have not presented any evidence to support the choice of particular 
restriction ratios. In order to make such a choice, we need more information about the 
cost structure of the industry, and we need a better understanding of how the DEA model 
represents the cost norm via the output weights. Understanding what the output weights 
really mean may be the most serious challenge when implementing relative weight 
restrictions, and this is partly due to the fact that some cost drivers have been excluded 
from the model, thereby making it harder to interpret the weights of the respective cost 
drivers that are included. We will come back to this problem in the next section, and 
present a possible solution to it. 
                                                 
14
 For each company, a single geography measure is computed by taking the average of the three geography 
variables. In order to remove scale effects, the physical values have been divided by the number of 
kilometers of HV-lines for each company. 
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5. Alternative methods: Virtual weight restrictions 
In this section we will explore some alternatives to the relative weight restrictions of 
section 4, given that we, as stated previously, would like to avoid unreasonably high 
efficiency scores / cost norms due to the introduction of the geography variables. It is 
hard to see how one could specify meaningful bounds for the absolute levels of the 
geography weights, and we will therefore limit the discussion to virtual weight 
restrictions, which we believe is an interesting alternative. In section 5.1 we call attention 
to some challenges with the relative weight restrictions, and explain why virtual weight 
restrictions, as defined in section 3.3, represent an interesting alternative. In sections 5.2-
5.4 we consider some alternatives with respect to virtual weight restrictions, and illustrate 
their effect on the DEA results. In section 5.5 we briefly discuss some other alternatives, 
before we conclude in section 5.6. 
5.1 Why virtual weight restrictions? 
Relative weight restrictions require choices to be made at a fairly detailed level in the 
model, as illustrated by the discussion in section 4. We need to specify which variables to 
include in the restrictions, as well as upper and/or lower bounds with respect to the ratio 
between their weights. Biases in the DEA results could arise if we make the wrong 
choices, e.g. by omitting relevant restrictions or by making false assumptions with 
respect to the bounds. 
The non-completeness of the DEA model, due to the way the model was constructed, 
makes these challenges more severe. As described in NVE (2006a/b), statistical tests 
where used to check whether variables should be included in the model or not. Some cost 
drivers, such as low voltage lines, where excluded (mainly) because they did not pass the 
statistical tests, hence their effect on costs will be picked up by one or more of the cost 
drivers that are included, such as net stations or high voltage lines. However, it is 
difficult to know which of the included cost drivers are picking up the cost effect 
corresponding to an excluded driver. This fact makes it difficult to interpret the output 
weights in a meaningful way, and to relate the values of different output weights via 
restrictions. Specifically, it may be difficult to relate the geography weights to the weight 
of HV-lines, since we do not know what the normal level of the HV-weights should be, 
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given that the HV-variable probably is picking up some of the effect of excluded cost 
drivers. 
In order to reduce the need for detailed assumptions/choices, we propose alternative 
weight restrictions at a more aggregate level. Specifically, we group the outputs with 
respect to the type of output, and specify restrictions with respect to the percentage share 
of the cost norm that each group accounts for. The following groups are natural 
candidates for such restrictions: 
1. Geography variables: forest, snow, coast  
2. Product variables: delivered energy, customers, cottage customers 
In the next three sections, we will analyze the effects of virtual weight restrictions with 
respect to these two variable groups, and compare with the effects of the relative weight 
restrictions in section 4. In order to limit the total weight of the geography variables we 
could add the following restriction to the LP-problem: 



r rjr
jCoastCoastjSnowSnowjForestForest
yp
ypypyp
*
*** ,,,
  (5.1) 
The number α has a value between 0 and 1, and represents the maximal share of the total 
cost norm (for the evaluated company *j ) that the geography variables may account for.  
In order to use very high values for the geography weights, a company must use zero or 
very low values for some other outputs. In order to avoid this we could specify a lower 
bound for some of the remaining variables, e.g. on the product variables energy and 
customers. After all, the core activity of the distribution companies is to deliver energy 
and serve customers, and the role of the other output variables is to adjust for the fact that 
different companies perform these activities under very different conditions. Then it 
seems reasonable that at least some weight should be put on these “core” variables. We 
therefore specify the following lower bound for the product variables’ share of the cost 
norm: 



r rjr
jCCustCCustjCustCustjEnergyEnergy
yp
ypypyp
*
*** ,,,
 (5.2) 
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The number β has a value between 0 and 1, and represents the minimal share of the total 
cost norm that the product variables may account for. 
5.2 Evaluation of alternative weight restrictions 
In this subsection we will evaluate the effects of restrictions (5.1) and (5.2). We will start 
by looking at some particular cases with respect to the values of α and β for which we 
study the detailed effects of the restrictions. We would like to stress that we have no 
evidence to support the choice of particular values for α and/or β, and we will therefore 
provide some sensitivity analyses that may be of some help in making these choices. We 
also look at the combined effect of the two restrictions. 
Maximum restriction - geography variables 
We start by looking at the effect of (5.1) for the case α = 0.4, i.e., not more than 40 % of 
the cost norm can be accounted for by the geography variables. The effect with respect to 
the efficiency scores is illustrated in figure 5.1, where we have also included the 
unrestricted efficiency scores, as well as the efficiency scores resulting from 
implementing the relative restrictions described in section 4.2-4.3. As we saw from the 
sensitivity analysis in section 4.3, the relative restrictions affect a large number of 
companies. The virtual restriction, on the other hand, has a strong effect for a few 
companies, while most of the companies are (almost) unaffected. 
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Figure 5.1: Effect of virtual weight restriction wrt geography (2006) 
Figure 5.2 shows the 15 companies that are most affected by the virtual geography 
restricton. The unrestricted efficiency scores, as well as the efficiency score reductions 
caused by the weight restrictions, are shown in parentheses, and the cost norm shares of 
the outputs (virtual weights) are shown as the horizontal bars. We see that when the 
restriction is imposed, many companies choose to shift weight from the geography 
variables to either HV-lines or net stations. Only five companies experience reductions in 
their efficiency scores of 10 % or more. 
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Figure 5.2: Companies most affected by the virtual weight restriction (2006) 
In figure 5.3, we compare the relative weight restrictions from section 4.2 and 4.3 to the 
virtual weight restriction given by (5.1). The figure shows the 15 companies that are most 
affected by the relative weight restrictions. As we saw in section 4.3, the relative weight 
restrictions have a significant effect for a large number of companies. The virtual weight 
restriction, on the other hand, only have a significant effect for a few companies. The 
diagram in the middle illustrates that the relative restrictions are stronger than the virtual 
restriction, since the latter restriction is satisfied for all but two of the companies when 
the former restriction is imposed. This is not surprising, since the virtual restriction 
allows greater flexibility for the company with respect to how the weights should be 
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adjusted in order to satisfy the restrictions. We see that in the case of the relative 
restrictions, the HV-variable make up for a large portion of the increased weight, while in 
the case of the virtual restriction the picture is more mixed. 
     
Figure 5.3: Comparison of relative and virtual weight restrictions (2006) 
We conclude this section with a sensitivity analysis, shown in figure 5.4, with respect to 
the maximum share of geography in the cost norms. We see that, as in the case of the 
relative restrictions in section 4.3, the average cost-weighted efficiency is not much 
influenced by the weight restrictions. The number of affected companies drops 
dramatically as the maximum share is increased, but the average efficiency reduction per 
affected company does not change that much. Hence, it seems that virtual restrictions will 
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to a greater extent punish companies that have chosen extreme weights, whereas the 
relative restrictions seem to affect a larger number of companies. Figure 5.4 also show 
the effect of the virtual weight restriction on the correlation between efficiency scores 
and two different measures of the geography variables’ importance for individual 
companies. Again, as in section 4.3, we see that the positive correlation that is observed 
in the unrestricted model (weight limit equal to 100 %) is reduced as the restriction is 
tightened, and zero correlation is obtained for a limit between 20 % and 40 %, depending 
on how the correlation coefficient is defined. The correlation between efficiency scores 
and the virtual weights on the product variables energy / customers is negative in the 
unrestricted case, and becomes less negative as the restriction is tightened. As we saw in 
section 4.3, the correlation becomes zero only when the geography variables are removed 
from the model. 
0 % 10 % 20 % 30 % 40 % 50 % 60 % 70 % 80 % 90 % 100 %
89.8 % 91.8 % 92.8 % 93.2 % 93.4 % 93.5 % 93.6 % 93.6 % 93.6 % 93.6 % 93.6 %
115 80 58 35 26 13 9 6 3 3 0
9.7 8.4 6.9 6.8 5.8 7.7 6.4 5.4 5.0 2.0 -
Over 50 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
25 - 50 8 6 4 3 2 1 0 0 0 0 0
10 - 25 29 12 4 4 3 4 3 1 0 0 0
 5 - 10 22 19 13 1 1 0 2 2 2 0 0
 0 -   5 54 42 36 27 20 8 4 3 1 3 0
No change 12 47 69 92 101 114 118 121 124 124 127
Corr(Eff, VirtualGeography) - -0.21 -0.08 0.05 0.12 0.17 0.22 0.25 0.29 0.30 0.32
Corr(Eff, PhysicalGeography) -0.43 -0.30 -0.16 -0.05 0.02 0.06 0.10 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.16
Corr(Eff, VirtualProducts) 0.00 -0.01 -0.07 -0.10 -0.13 -0.14 -0.15 -0.15 -0.16 -0.17 -0.18
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Figure 5.4: Sensitivity of efficiency scores w.r.t. max geography share (2006) 
Minimum restriction - product variables  
We will now look at the effect of (5.2), and we will start by looking at the case where 
β = 0.3, i.e., the product variables’ share of the total cost norm cannot be smaller than 
30 %. The effect of this restriction on the efficiency scores is shown in figure 5.5 below, 
and we see that there are a few companies with very large effects, and all of them are 
super-efficient prior to the introduction of the new restriction. 
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Figure 5.5: Effect of restriction (5.2) on efficiency scores (2006) 
Figure 5.6 shows the identity of the companies that are most affected by the new 
restriction. Since less than 30 % of the norm was explained by energy and customers for 
all of these companies, the new restriction becomes binding, and they will all have cost 
norms, after the restriction is introduced, where exactly 30 % of the value comes from 
these outputs. The relative shares of the other outputs do not seem to change very much 
as a result of the new restriction. 
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Figure 5.6: Companies most affected by restriction (5.2) (2006) 
The sensitivity analysis in figure 5.7 below shows that the number of affected companies, 
as well as the average efficiency score reduction per affected company, increases 
considerably as the lower bound for the cost norm share is increased. This is not 
unexpected, since we have seen the same property in the case of the max-restriction for 
the geography variables in section 5.2. Again, as in the case of the other restrictions we 
have considered, the average cost-weighted industry efficiency is not much affected by 
changes in the restriction. Not surprisingly, the negative correlation between efficiency 
scores and the virtual weight on the product variables that we observe in the unrestricted 
model (limit equal to 0 %) is reduced as the restriction is tightened, and a similar effect is 
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observed with respect to the correlation between efficiency scores and the geography 
variables. 
0 % 10 % 20 % 30 % 40 % 50 %
93.6 % 93.6 % 93.5 % 93.2 % 92.8 % 91.7 %
0 21 36 43 61 84
- 1.4 2.5 4.9 6.4 8.2
Over 50 0 0 0 0 1 2
25 - 50 0 0 1 1 2 6
10 - 25 0 1 1 6 8 12
 5 - 10 0 0 3 6 8 20
 0 -   5 0 20 31 30 42 44
No change 127 106 91 84 66 43
Corr(Eff, VirtualGeography) 0.32 0.30 0.26 0.19 0.12 -0.02
Corr(Eff, PhysicalGeography) 0.16 0.15 0.13 0.09 0.03 -0.07
Corr(Eff, VirtualProducts) -0.18 -0.14 -0.09 -0.01 0.09 0.17
Minimum energy / customers share
Industry efficiency
No. of affected comp.
Average reduction
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Figure 5.7: Sensitivity analysis w.r.t. virtual restrictions on product variables (2006) 
Combination of max and min virtual restrictions 
The restrictions given by (5.1) and (5.2) may also be combined in the same model. We 
illustrate the combined effect, for α = 0.4 and β = 0.3, in figure 5.8 and 5.9 where we 
compare the combined effect to the effect of using only (5.1). The identity of the most 
affected companies, as well as their efficiency score reductions (in parentheses), are 
shown in figure 5.9. We see that the combined restrictions have a stronger effect than the 
max-restriction alone, and for one company (Evenes) the difference is dramatic. 
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Figure 5.8: Effect of combined restrictions (2006) 
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Figure 5.9: Companies most affected by combined restrictions (2006) 
5.3 Weight restrictions and reference companies 
Figure 5.10 below lists all the companies that appear in the reference sets in the 2006 data 
set and illustrates the relative contribution of each reference company to the total cost 
norm of the industry. The cost norm contribution of company j is computed as its cost (xj) 
times the sum of its weight (λj) in all the reference sets of which it is a member. The 
columns of the diagram correspond to different versions of the DEA model. The leftmost 
column corresponds to the unrestricted model, and columns 2-4 correspond to some of 
the weight restrictions that we have discussed previously. Next to the company names we 
have indicated their virtual weights on geography and energy/customers, respectively, in 
the unrestricted case. We see that a relatively small number of companies explain a large 
share of the industry cost norm. In the unrestricted case, for instance, more than 80 % of 
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the cost norm is explained by 10 companies. Out of these 10 companies, one has a virtual 
geography weight of more than 40 %, and three have a virtual weight on 
energy/customers lower than 30 %. We see that the introduction of weight restrictions 
does not have dramatic effects on the composition of the cost norm, although there are 
some differences. 
Modalen
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Hålogaland Kraft (21; 47)
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Kvikne-Rennebu Kraftlag (22; 14)
Flesberg Elektrisitetsverk (8; 91)
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Andøy Energi (50; 50)
Luster Energiverk (45; 23)
Ballangen Energi (74; 26)
Tydal Kommunale Energiverk (27; 73)
Drangedal Everk (12; 0)
Bindal Kraftlag (34; 10)
Hallingdal Kraftnett (11; 62)
Røros Elektrisitetsverk (22; 51)
Evenes Kraftforsyning (34; 1)
Rødøy-Lurøy Kraftverk (80; 20)
Nesset Kraft (100; 0)
Fusa Kraftlag (77; 8)
Fortum Distribution (0; 56)
Jæren Everk Komm. f. i Hå (1; 61)
Nord-Østerdal Kraftlag (0; 10)
Trollfjord Kraft (58; 42)
Trøgstad Elverk (3; 0)
Modalen Kraftlag (100; 0)
Klepp Energi (0; 4)
Askøy Energi (9; 85)
Krødsherad Everk (34; 66)
Lyse Nett (2; 65)
Nord-Salten Kraftlag (22; 0)
Eidefoss (13; 22)
Fredrikstad Energi Nett (1; 96)
Ørskog Energi (41; 46)
Hafslund Nett (0; 100)
Energi 1 Follo-Røyken (0; 57)
 
Figure 5.10: Reference companies in the 2006 data set 
Figures 5.11 and 5.12 show the ratio between each reference company’s contribution to 
the industry cost norm, and its own actual cost, where the companies have been sorted 
according to the virtual geography weight and the virtual weight on energy/customers, 
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respectively. The highest observed ratio is for Modalen, whose cost norm contribution is 
148 times as high as its own actual cost. Figures 5.11 and 5.12 show the names of all 
companies with a ratio of 10 or more, and we see that all these 9 companies appear 
among the 12 most important reference companies in figure 5.10. Together they account 
for over 60 % of the industry norm
15
. From the figures we see some indication that 
companies with high (low) weight on geography (energy/customers) explain more of the 
cost norm, relative to their own actual cost, than other companies, but the picture is 
somewhat mixed. 
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Figure 5.11: Reference companies and virtual weights on geography (2006) 
                                                 
15
 The relatively large weight of small companies in the industry cost norm is a problem in itself, since it 
makes the DEA results vulnerable to the numbers reported by those companies, and this problem was 
discussed by Bjørndal and Bjørndal (2006a). 
SNF Report No 33/08 
 
53 
 
Askøy Energi
Krødsherad Everk
Energi 1 Follo-
Røyken
Ørskog Energi
Eidefoss Klepp Energi
Trøgstad Elverk
Nord-Salten
Modalen Kraftlag
0
15
30
45
60
75
90
105
120
135
150
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
C
o
st
 n
o
rm
 c
o
n
tr
. 
/ 
co
m
p
an
y'
s 
o
w
n
 c
o
st
Sh
ar
e
 o
f 
ge
o
gr
ap
h
y 
in
 c
o
st
 n
o
rm
Companies
Share of energy & customers in cost norm Norm contribution / company's own cost
 
Figure 5.12: Reference companies and virtual weights on energy/customers (2006) 
We will use the example of Modalen to illustrate an important difference between the 
relative and virtual weight restrictions. Modalen has all of its weight on geography, and 
we saw in the previous section that its efficiency score was significantly reduced (-15 and 
-8 %-points) when we introduced the virtual weight restrictions given by (5.1) and (5.2), 
with α = 0.4 and β = 0.3, respectively. However, figure 5.10 shows that Modalen’s role 
as reference company is not visibly affected by the virtual weight restrictions. The 
relative weight restrictions, on the other hand, will reduce Modalen’s efficiency score 
dramatically (-25 %-points) and eliminate the company from the reference sets. The 
reason for this phenomenon is that the virtual weight restrictions given by (5.1) and (5.2) 
apply only to the company that is being evaluated, and not to the potential reference 
companies. Figure 5.13 below illustrates this. The numbers in the table are based on a 
DEA model with a weight restriction according to (5.1) and with α = 0.4. We have 
chosen Modalen and Sunndal as examples, since Modalen is one of the reference 
companies of Sunndal. The table illustrates that when the cost norm of a company is 
evaluated based on the company’s own DEA weights, the virtual weight restriction is 
satisfied. For Modalen, the virtual weight on the geography variables is 40 %, i.e., exactly 
at the upper bound, whereas for Sunndal the corresponding weight is 38.8 %. However, if 
we evaluate Modalen with the weights of Sunndal, for which Modalen serves as reference 
company, the restriction is not satisfied, since 66.6 % of Modalen’s cost norm then is 
explained by the geography factors. Hence, when Modalen appears in the reference set of 
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Sunndal, it is not subject to the same weight restriction as when its own efficiency is 
evaluated. Virtual weight restrictions in the form of (5.1) are company-specific, since the 
output weights are multiplied by the physical quantities (the y’s) of the company that is 
being evaluated. The relative weight restrictions, on the other hand, are not company-
specific, since they only involve the output weights (the p’s ). 
Output NOK Relative NOK Relative NOK Relative NOK Relative
Energy 184 476 8.7 % 2 461 515 16.3 %
Customers 11 000 461 61.2 % 694 876 33.4 %
Cottage customers
HV-lines
Net stations 1 091 987 51.3 % 9 281 886 61.4 %
Interface
Forest 1 549 532 8.6 % 17 913 0.9 %
Snow 850 975 40.0 % 3 377 971 22.3 % 5 421 689 30.2 % 1 365 826 65.7 %
Coast
Sum 2 127 437 100.0 % 15 121 372 100.0 % 17 971 682 100.0 % 2 078 615 100.0 %
Virtual geography weight 40.0 % 22.3 % 38.8 % 66.6 %
Modalen norm based on 
Modalen weights
Modalen norm based on 
Sunndal weights
Sunndal norm based on 
Modalen weights
Sunndal norm based on 
Sunndal weights
 
Figure 5.13: Alternative cost norms for Modalen (2006) 
The apparent asymmetry of the virtual weight restrictions should not necessarily be seen 
as a problem. The purpose of these restrictions is to avoid very high efficiency scores as a 
result of unreasonable weighting of the output variables. Such unreasonable weights 
occur when the evaluated company has a special output profile, making it difficult to find 
comparable companies that can serve as reference. In a model where super efficiency is 
allowed, i.e., a company is not allowed to be its own reference, this will be an even 
bigger problem. It seems plausible to restrict the company’s own weights based on this 
argument, as we have done in (5.1) and (5.2), but it is not obvious that it should lead to 
restrictions on the weights of the other companies
16
. In other words, the fact that a 
company is special should not be rewarded with an unreasonably high efficiency score, 
but it should not prevent the company from being a reference for other companies! 
                                                 
16
 Beasley and Wong (1990) argue that such restrictions could be more in line with the logic behind the 
basic DEA model, i.e., that each company is free to choose its weights as it wants, but subject to constraints 
with respect to the effect of these weights on the efficiciency scores of other companies. 
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If asymmetry really is seen as a problem, we could replace (5.1) by the following set of 
restrictions
17
: 



r rjr
jCoastCoastjSnowSnowjForestForest
yp
ypypyp ,,,
    for all j=1,…,n. (5.3) 
Since the restriction in (5.1) is included in (5.3), the latter set of restrictions will be 
stronger than the former
18
. This is illustrated by figure 5.14 below, where we see that the 
symmetric version yields efficiency scores less than or equal to the efficiency scores with 
the company-specific restriction. Figure 5.15 illustrates this for different values of the 
restriction limit. We see that the symmetric version will affect a larger number of 
companies. The maximum effect is not very different for the two versions, but the 
average effect is smaller for the symmetric version in all but one case. With respect to the 
correlation between efficiency scores and the physical geography measure, the symmetric 
restriction has a stronger effect than the company-specific restriction. 
 
                                                 
17
 Another alternative, suggested by Wong & Beasley (1990), is to replace the output quantities in (5.1) by 
average quantities. See also Sarrico & Dyson (2004) or Thanassoulis et al. (1997) for a discussion of the 
various alternatives. 
18
 In general, stronger restrictions can cause the LP-problem to become infeasible. This will not occur, 
however, if the problem only includes restrictions of the type given by (5.3), since the restrictions can 
always be satisfied by setting some output weights equal to zero. This would be equivalent to removing the 
corresponding output variables from the DEA model. 
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Figure 5.14: Symmetric versus company-specific virtual weight restrictions (2006) 
0 % 10 % 20 % 30 % 40 % 50 % 60 % 70 % 80 % 90 % 100 %
Company-specific 115 80 58 35 26 13 9 6 3 3 0
Symmetric 115 112 99 95 80 57 37 23 12 6 0
Company-specific 9.7 8.4 6.9 6.8 5.8 7.7 6.4 5.4 5.0 2.0 -
Symmetric 9.7 8.1 7.1 5.4 4.1 3.5 3.0 2.7 2.7 2.0 -
Company-specific 69.4 63.7 57.0 49.0 39.1 26.8 17.1 10.4 6.2 3.0 0.0
Symmetric 69.4 64.2 57.5 49.3 39.3 27.2 17.1 12.4 8.6 4.0 0.0
Corr(Eff, PhysicalGeography)
Company-specific -0.43 -0.30 -0.16 -0.05 0.02 0.06 0.10 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.16
Symmetric -0.43 -0.35 -0.26 -0.17 -0.07 0.02 0.08 0.11 0.14 0.15 0.16
Average reduction
Maximum geography share
No. of affected comp.
Maximum reduction
 
Figure 5.15: Sensitivity analyses for company-specific and symmetric weight restrictions 
5.4 Which companies are punished – one or several geography factors? 
Some companies may differ with respect to the number of geography factors that they are 
exposed to. A possible objection that has been put forward against virtual weight 
restrictions á la (5.1) is that they may punish companies that are exposed to several 
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geography factors in an unfair manner, since the restriction is formulated with respect to 
the sum of cost norm shares for the geography variables. In order to investigate whether 
this is true, we have looked at the values of the geography variables for the companies 
most affected by restriction (5.1) with  = 0.4. Figure 5.16 shows companies with 
efficiency score reductions of at least 0.5 percentage points. We also show the ratio 
between the maximum and average value of the three geography variables for each 
company
19
. If it is true that companies with large efficiency score reductions tend to have 
relatively high values of several geography variables, then the maximum value should be 
relatively low compared to the average for these companies. However, the diagram does 
not indicate that this is true. Figure 5.17 shows statistics for the geography variables for 
affected and non-affected companies, with respect to both virtual and relative weight 
restrictions. The numbers show, not surprisingly, that affected companies have higher 
values for the geography variables than non-affected companies. However the ratio 
between maximum and average values of the geography variables does not seem to be 
lower for affected than for non-affected companies. For the 2006 data set, the opposite is 
in fact true, both for the virtual and relative weight restrictions. A possible explanation 
for this result is that an unrestricted DEA model in itself tends to favor companies that 
have “extreme” output combinations, i.e., that have very high values for one output factor 
rather than moderate amounts of several factors. Hence, companies in the former 
category tend to get punished harder by any type of weight restriction than companies 
belonging to the latter category. 
                                                 
19
 I.e., for each company we have computed the ratio Max(Forest, Snow, Coast) / Average(Forest, Snow, 
Coast). 
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Figure 5.16: Companies most affected by virtual weight restriction (2006,  = 0.4) 
No. of 
companies
Forest / 
HV
Snow / 
HV
Coast / 
HV
Max (Forest, Snow, Coast) / 
Avg(Forest, Snow, Coast)
Affected 26 0.157 0.332 0.133 1.993
Non-affected 101 0.093 0.193 0.043 1.960
No. of 
companies
Forest / 
HV
Snow / 
HV
Coast / 
HV
Max (Forest, Snow, Coast) / 
Avg(Forest, Snow, Coast)
Affected 91 0.112 0.254 0.078 2.018
Non-affected 36 0.093 0.140 0.020 1.835
(a) Virtual restriction (max 40 % geography)
(b) Relative restriction (2x)  
Figure 5.17: Affected and non-affected companies (2006,  = 0.4) 
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5.5 Summary and conclusions  
Since the DEA model is not complete, meaning that it does not contain all the relevant 
cost drivers, it will be difficult to interpret the weights and to relate them via relative 
weight restrictions. We have therefore formulated two types of virtual weight restrictions 
defined on groups of variables: an upper bound for the percentage share of geography 
variables in the cost norm of any company, as well as a lower bound for the share of the 
product variables. Because they are defined with respect to groups of variables, they 
allow for more flexibility in setting the weights than the relative restrictions, and our 
analyses indicate that the level of the restrictions can be set such that the effects for most 
companies are relatively minor, while companies with extreme weighting schemes are 
punished. Such a property should fit well in with the intentions behind NVE’s proposal, 
namely to avoid unreasonably high efficiency scores as a result of the geography 
variables. An important feature of the virtual weight restrictions given by (5.1) and (5.2) 
at is that they are company-specific, and it may be argued that a symmetric version 
should be used. We question whether the asymmetry really poses a problem, but we also 
discuss the consequences of imposing symmetric restrictions. We also test the hypothesis 
that virtual restrictions with respect to groups of output variables will punish companies 
with combinations of several geography factors harder than companies with only one 
geography factor, but we find no support for it. 
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6. Determination of limits 
As the sensitivity analyses in section 5 clearly demonstrate, the effect of weight 
restrictions depends on the exact limits that are determined. In the literature (see for 
instance Thanassoulis et al. (2004)) various methods are mentioned, including using 
- Shadow prices from unrestricted DEA models 
- Shadow prices for a subset of model companies 
- Information about prices or costs 
- Average values from e.g. regression analysis 
- Expert opinions 
6.1 Shadow prices and degeneracy 
One possibility is to use information on the shadow prices in the unrestricted DEA 
models. This however, is a method that should be used with caution. One reason for that 
is degeneracy in the LP solutions where efficiency scores are computed. If the LP 
problem is degenerate, there will be multiple dual solutions, i.e. multiple sets of shadow 
prices that all solve the dual LP problem. In the data set from 2006, there is some 
degeneracy connected to the interface variable, and figure 6.1 illustrates by showing the 
lowest/highest possible values of the optimal interface weight for each company. The 
average difference is NOK 410, while the maximal difference is NOK 4 907. Figure 6.2 
shows a summary of similar computations for 2005 and 2006, and we see that the 
interface weight is the only non-unique weight in both years. The non-uniqueness of the 
interface weight occurs for companies which have nothing of the interface variable, and 
for which all the reference companies have nothing of it as well
20
. There were 12 non-
unique instances in 2005 and 38 in 2006. 
                                                 
20
 Note that the virtual interface weights are unique for all companies, since the virtual output quantities are 
found by multiplying physical quantities by the corresponding output weights. 
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Figure 6.1: Optimal weights for the interface variable (2006) 
Low 
average
High 
average
Average 
diff.
Max 
diff.
Low 
average
High 
average
Average 
diff.
Max 
diff.
Energy 21 21 0 0 32 32 0 0
Customers 605 605 0 0 510 510 0 0
Cottage customers 1 531 1 531 0 0 1 165 1 165 0 0
HV-lines 4 864 4 864 0 0 8 735 8 735 0 0
Net stations 15 979 15 979 0 0 12 896 12 896 0 0
Interface 996 1 197 201 4 956 1 048 1 458 410 4 907
Forest 29 284 29 284 0 0 28 184 28 184 0 0
Snow 18 445 18 445 0 0 24 193 24 193 0 0
Coast 22 847 22 847 0 0 22 700 22 700 0 0
2005 2006
 
Figure 6.2: Optimal low/high weights for all variables 
6.2 Information about prices or cost 
Another alternative is to use information about prices or costs, for instance from 
regression analyses or expert opinions. Geography factors will influence the annual cost 
of capital, through investment expenditures and economic life. Moreover, geography 
factors will affect annual operating and maintenance costs. The challenge is to find 
appropriate multipliers to take into consideration the difference between “easy” and 
Average low 1 048 
Average high 1 458 
Average difference 410 
Max difference 4 907 
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“difficult” geographic locations, along the dimensions that are not taken into account by 
other output variables (like customer density). 
How specifically to determine the limits, and which level of detail that is necessary, must 
also depend on what kind of limit we consider, whether it is absolute, relative or virtual 
weight restrictions. 
Relative weight restrictions 
If we for instance are considering relative weight restrictions, it can be useful to start by 
investigating what effect changes in outputs (or partial outputs) will have on the cost 
norms, and how the shadow prices can be interpreted. For this purpose, we will use the 
(unrestricted) weights for Nord-Trøndelag Elektrisitetsverk AS in 2006, shown in figure 
6.3. This company has positive weights for energy, net stations, as well as the forest and 
snow variables. Net stations account for most of the cost norm, with a virtual weight of 
70.5 %. The last two columns of the table show how much the output quantities may be 
altered without causing changes in the output weights. 
Physical 
quantity Slack
Weight 
(NOK)
Cost norm 
(1000 
NOK)
Share of 
cost norm
Allovable 
increase
Allowable 
decrease
Energy 1 934 568.0 22 42 739 12.1 % 1 993 620.0 1 756 380.0
Customers 70 517.0 3 177.5 73 697.5 INF
Cottage customers 8 487.0 10 777.1 19 263.9 INF
HV-lines 5 123.0 347.8 5 470.7 INF
Net stations 6 511.0 38 284 249 267 70.5 % 8 599.1 6 322.4
Interface 0.0 643.5 643.4 INF
Forest 670.2 16 206 10 861 3.1 % 868.7 497.1
Snow 1 296.9 39 081 50 685 14.3 % 1 747.2 1 180.9
Coast 43.3 82.9 126.2 INF
Sum 353 551 100.0 %  
Figure 6.3: Unrestricted DEA results for Nord-Trøndelag Elektrisitetsverk (2006) 
Figure 6.4 illustrates the effect of installing 1 kilometer of additional high voltage lines 
(through air). The effect on the cost norm will depend on the type of line that is installed. 
HV-lines have zero weight, so the only way that additional lines can influence the cost 
norm is via the geography variables, since the geography indices are scaled with HV-
lines. Note that if the new line is a sea/ground cable, the effect on the cost norm will be 
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zero, since only air cables are included in the scaling factor. Since both the forest variable 
and the snow variable have positive weight, the effect on the cost norm will indeed be 
positive in this case. One kilometer of additional HV-lines causes the forest and snow 
variables to increase by 0.154 and 0.298, respectively, which correspond to the values of 
the geography indices, where we have normalized the values as described in section 4.2. 
Multiplying the increments by the corresponding output weights of NOK 16 206 and 
NOK 39 081, respectively, gives us a total increase in the cost norm of NOK 14 132. 
Note that these calculations are only valid if the total increase, measured relative to the 
allowable increase of the output quantities, is less than 100 %-points
21
. 
New 
physical 
quantity Increase
% of 
allowable 
increase
Weight 
(NOK)
Increase in 
cost norm 
(NOK)
Energy 1 934 568.0 22
Customers 70 517.0
Cottage customers 8 487.0
HV-lines 5 124.0 1.000 0.02 % 0 0
Net stations 6 511.0 38 284
Interface 0.0
Forest 670.3 0.154 0.02 % 16 206 2 494
Snow 1 297.2 0.298 0.02 % 39 081 11 638
Coast 43.3 0.010 0.01 % 0 0
Sum 0.06 % 14 132  
Figure 6.4: Effect on the cost norm of installing 1 extra kilometer of HV-line, without 
relative weight restrictions (NTE, 2006) 
We repeat the analysis in the above example for the case where the DEA model includes 
weight restrictions. Note that the geography variables have a total weight of 17.4 % for 
this company. Hence, the marginal output values for this company would not be affected 
by a moderate restriction on the virtual weights. In Figure 6.5 we show the weights that 
result when we restrict the weights of each of the geography variables to be less than or 
equal to 2 times the weight of HV-lines. Figure 6.6 illustrates the effect of installing an 
extra kilometer of HV-lines, given that the new line is through air, and hence will 
influence the value of the geography factors. The weight of HV-lines is now positive and 
                                                 
21
 See chapter 5 in Hillier and Hillier (2008) for an explanation of “The 100 Percent Rule”. 
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equal to NOK 4 228, and the extra kilometer of line will cause the cost norm to increase 
by this amount. The values of the increased forest/snow variables have to be added to this 
amount, and the total increase in the cost norm will be NOK 8 047. Note that if we had 
installed a sea/ground cable instead of air cable, the geography factor would not have 
been affected, and the total marginal value of the extra line length would be only 
NOK 4 228. Figure 6.7 summarizes the effect on the cost norms of installing an extra 
kilometer of line under various assumptions with respect to the type of line installed and 
the type of DEA model that is used. It is interesting to note that, for this particular 
company, relative investment incentives are clearly influenced by the introduction of the 
relative weight restrictions. 
Physical 
quantity Slack
Weight 
(NOK)
Cost norm 
(1000 
NOK)
Share of 
cost norm
Allovable 
increase
Allowable 
decrease
Energy 1 934 568.0 51 98 027 28.2 % 2 022 730.0 1 897 640.0
Customers 70 517.0 177 12 508 3.6 % 73 850.3 67 949.5
Cottage customers 8 487.0 10 777.9 0 19 264.9 INF
HV-lines 5 123.0 4 228 21 659 6.2 % 5 320.3 4 607.1
Net stations 6 511.0 30 612 199 313 57.3 % 6 824.7 6 316.2
Interface 0.0 680.9 0 680.9 INF
Forest 670.2 8 456 5 667 1.6 % 768.8 412.2
Snow 1 296.9 8 456 10 966 3.1 % 1 395.6 1 128.6
Coast 43.3 32.6 75.9 INF
Sum 348 139 100.0 %  
Figure 6.5: Results from a DEA model with relative weight restrictions (NTE, 2006) 
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New 
physical 
quantity Increase
% of 
allowable 
increase
Weight 
(NOK)
Increase in 
cost norm 
(NOK)
Energy 1 934 568.0 51
Customers 70 517.0 177
Cottage customers 8 487.0
HV-lines 5 124.0 1.000 0.02 % 4 228 4 228
Net stations 6 511.0 30 612
Interface 0.0
Forest 670.3 0.154 0.02 % 8 456 1 301
Snow 1 297.2 0.298 0.02 % 8 456 2 518
Coast 43.3 0.010 0.01 % 0 0
Sum 0.07 % 8 047  
Figure 6.6: Installing an extra kilometer of line (through air), restricted DEA model 
(NTE, 2006) 
Unrestricted Restricted (2x)
Ground/sea cable 0 4 228
Air cable 14 132 8 047
Type of line
DEA model
 
Figure 6.7: Summary of incremental effects in various cases (NTE, 2006) 
Virtual weight restrictions 
With virtual weight restrictions on the geography variables, we are concerned with how 
large share of the total cost norm that can be determined by the geography variables. As 
shown in the examples in section 5, this may be complemented with lower bounds on the 
virtual weights on product variables like delivered energy and the number of customers. 
A starting point for determining the specific limits could be the average cost allocated to 
different cost groups, as illustrated in figure 6.8. 
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Figure 6.8: Cost allocated to cost groups (2006) 
Combined with an evaluation of the maximal effect of geography variables on annual 
cost within the different cost groups, this may serve to establish limits on total cost 
shares. It would also be useful to establish cost groups where geography factors do not 
influence cost. Such a cost group could be customer related cost, i.e. cost for invoicing, 
customer service, etc. The tables in figure 6.9 illustrate how the geography factors 
influence the relative shares of the different cost groups. We have sorted the companies 
according to the average value of their geography variables, where the average for each 
company have been converted to a number between 0 and 1 by dividing them by the 
value of the HV-variable for that company. We see that companies with a high average 
value for the geography variables tend to have relatively high operating costs relative to 
other costs, while the opposite is true for losses. 
0 %
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80 %
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0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 9000 10000
Cumulative cost (MNOK)
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Interest (16 %)
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Upper 
percentile
No. of 
companies
Depre-
ciation Interest
Operating 
costs Losses VOLL
100 % 127 20 % 18 % 49 % 10 % 3 %
40 % 51 20 % 17 % 52 % 8 % 4 %
20 % 26 20 % 16 % 52 % 8 % 3 %
10 % 13 18 % 16 % 56 % 7 % 2 %
5 % 6 16 % 16 % 59 % 7 % 2 %
(a) 2005 data set  
Upper 
percentile
No. of 
companies
Depre-
ciation Interest
Operating 
costs Losses VOLL
100 % 127 19 % 16 % 46 % 15 % 3 %
40 % 51 19 % 15 % 50 % 12 % 4 %
20 % 26 19 % 15 % 50 % 12 % 5 %
10 % 13 18 % 15 % 54 % 10 % 3 %
5 % 6 16 % 15 % 55 % 10 % 4 %
(b) 2006 data set  
Figure 6.9: Cost allocation for different levels of Avg(Forest, Snow, Coast) / HV 
Another possibility for establishing a limit on the geography factors’ share of total cost is 
to use information from efficiency analyses without geography variables. In figure 6.10 
below we have sorted the companies according to the value of their geography variables, 
as in figure 6.9 above, and we show efficiency scores from an analysis which does not 
include the geography variables. The diagram clearly illustrates the negative correlation 
between efficiency scores and the geography variables which we observed from the 
sensitivity analyses in sections 4 and 5. In order to set a limit for the percentage share of 
the cost norm explained by the geography factors, we could use information concerning a 
subset of the companies with highest values for the geography variables. The company 
with the highest value for the geography variables
22
 is also the company with the lowest 
efficiency score, equal to 49.8 %. The inefficiency of 51.1 % experienced by this 
company could be the result of several causes, including geography-related causes, and 
could serve as an upper bound on the cost share explained by the geography factors. We 
also show a cumulative efficiency score for each company, computed as the cost 
weighted average efficiency for all companies with an average level of the geography 
factors larger than or equal to the company in question. If we look at the four companies 
                                                 
22
 Austevoll. 
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with highest value for the geography variables
23
, they have a cost weighted efficiency 
score of 65.5 %, which would translate into a limit for the virtual geography weight of 
approximately 35 %. 
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Figure 6.10: Efficiency scores from a model without geography variables (2006) 
6.3 Summary  
In our opinion it should be possible to establish limits on the total share of the cost norms 
that can be attributed to geography variables. However, this is a question that should be 
further pursued, in dialogue with the industry. 
                                                 
23
 Austevoll, Tysnes, Nesset and Trollfjord. 
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7. Other implementation issues 
The DEA field has seen a large growth in recent years, both in terms of theoretical 
research and applications. This motivated the development of software specifically 
dedicated to solve DEA models, although most of the general-purpose mathematical 
programming software can be adapted to solve DEA problems. Examples of program 
code for a DEA model is described in Olesen and Petersen (1996) for GAMS modeling 
language and in Emrouznejad (2005) for SAS/OR. These codes can be easily adapted to 
suit different DEA model formulations. At present, there are several alternative DEA 
softwares available, including commercial and non-commercial packages. All have good 
user interfaces and allow interoperability with other applications to read data and export 
results. State-of-the-art theoretical developments in the DEA theory tend to be 
implemented relatively fast in advanced modeling options available in a few DEA 
softwares. Therefore, software modeling capability is usually not a limitation to practical 
DEA assessments. A recent review of DEA software can be found in Barr (2004), 
although the features of the software at the time of that review are different from the 
latest versions available in 2008. Another DEA software review is available in Herrero 
and Pascoe (2002). 
In this section we will provide a summary overview of the capabilities of the commercial 
and non-commercial DEA software in the versions available in 2008. We will only 
consider the aspects that are more likely to be needed in this project: 
 Type of weight restrictions available 
 Estimation of super-efficiency scores 
 Estimation of Malmquist indices 
 Possibility to select companies to include/exclude in the assessment 
The software packages considered in figure 7.1 are those included in Barr (2004), except 
the Pioneer (http://faculty.smu.edu/barr/pioneer/ ) and EMQ OnFront (http://www.on-
focus.co.kr/econo06.asp ), as we could not find any information available in the Internet. 
The homepages of the software are: 
 DEA Solver Pro (http://www.saitech-inc.com/Products/Prod-DSP.asp ) 
 Frontier Analyst (http://www.banxia.com/frontier/index.html ) 
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 PIM-DEA Software (http://www.deasoftware.co.uk/ ). This software corresponds 
to the new version of the Warwick DEA software, which was renamed, since the 
developers moved to Aston University, UK. 
 DEA Excel Solver (http://www.deafrontier.com/othermodels.html ) 
 DEAP (http://www.uq.edu.au/economics/cepa/deap.htm ) 
 EMS (http://www.wiso.uni-dortmund.de/lsfg/or/scheel/ems/ ) 
 Commercial software Non-commercial software 
 
DEA 
Solver Pro 
Frontier 
Analyst 
PIM-DEA 
Software 
DEA 
Excel 
Solver 
DEAP EMS 
From: SAITECH BANXIA Aston Univ. J. Zhu T. Coelli O. Scheel 
Absolute weights ? ? yes ? no no 
Assurance regions /  
Relative weights 
yes no yes yes no yes 
Virtual weights yes yes yes ? no no 
Superefficiency yes yes yes yes no yes 
Malmquist index yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Select companies to 
assess 
no yes yes ? no yes 
Figure 7.1: Software overview 
Figure 7.1 shows that the PIM-DEA Software, developed by Emmanuel Thanassoulis and 
Ali Emrouznejad from the Aston University has available all the features that are 
anticipated to be required for this project. 
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8. Conclusions 
In this report we have studied weight restrictions in the DEA model for distribution 
networks. The starting point is the NVE model with a single input, total cost, and various 
outputs, representing delivered energy, the number of customers, and a number of other 
variables connected to the size and structure of the network and the geographic and 
climatic challenges of transporting power in the license areas. When applying the DEA 
model to the data of the distribution companies for 2005 and 2006, we notice large 
differences in absolute and relative shadow prices, and extreme weight on “geography” 
variables, especially for small companies. Moreover, it seems to be a tendency that 
companies, that have a large weight on geographic variables and / or a low weight on 
transported energy and customers, become super efficient. This seems unreasonable, and 
one remedy may be to restrict prices / weights for individual outputs, or combinations of 
outputs, through weight restrictions. 
There are various ways to impose weight restrictions, and we consider absolute, relative 
and virtual weight restrictions with respect to the NVE single input DEA model. We 
show how to formulate the LP problems and how to interpret the restrictions. We discuss 
the relative price restrictions suggested for geography and high voltage variables by NVE 
(2008), and propose a reformulation of the geography variables to make them easier to 
interpret, and comparable to HV lines. Moreover, we consider an alternative approach, 
using virtual weight restrictions on the combination of the three geography variables, 
forest, snow, and coast. Comparing the effects of the virtual approach to the relative, we 
notice that with relative weight restrictions, more companies are affected, but to a lesser 
extent. Moreover, we consider combining the maximum on virtual weight restrictions on 
geography variables with minimum virtual restrictions on delivered energy and 
customers. Both variants reduce super efficiency in the results. The positive correlation 
that exists between efficiency scores and the virtual weight on the geography variables in 
the unrestricted case decreases as a result of the restrictions. 
An important task when introducing weight restrictions in the DEA analysis is to 
determine the specific limits on the weights. Finding reasonable limits, depends on which 
type of weight restrictions that are in consideration, and should be based on knowledge of 
cost and technology in the industry. It is an issue that needs to be worked on further, and 
we recommend doing it in cooperation with the industry. Concerning the choice of type 
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of weight restrictions, we have shown through the analysis of the data, that different 
methods have different impacts on the efficiency results. An advantage of the virtual 
weight restrictions on combinations of outputs is that they are on a more aggregated level 
than the relative ones, implying that the regulator does not have to go into so much detail. 
This may be an advantage if outputs represent “more than themselves”, for instance by 
being “proxy” measures on certain cost drivers, or if they represent other correlated 
factors that are not included in the model. In practice, it may be easier to agree on overall 
effects on the total cost norm from a subset of outputs, rather than reasonable 
comparisons of two and two outputs. 
Finally, the report discusses implementation of DEA models with weight restrictions, and 
gives a short overview of available software and their elements. 
 
 
SNF Report No 33/08 
 
73 
 
References 
Allen, R., A. Athanassopoulos, R.G. Dyson, and E. Thanassoulis (1997), “Weights 
Restrictions and Value Judgements in Data Envelopment Analysis: Evolution, 
Development and Future Directions”, Annals of Operations Research 73, 13-34. 
Banker, R.D. (1993), “Maximum Likelihood, Consistency and Data Envelopment 
Analysis: A Statistical Foundation”, Management Science 39/10, 1265-1273. 
Barr, R.S. (2004), “DEA software tools and technology - A state-of-the-art survey”. In 
Handbook on Data Envelopment Analysis, ed. by William W. Cooper, Lawrence M. 
Seiford, and Joe Zhu, 99-138. 
Bjørndal, E. and M. Bjørndal (2006a), “Nettregulering 2007 – Effektivitetsmåling, 
gjennomsnittlig effektivitet og aldersparameter”, SNF Report 37/06. 
Bjørndal, E. and M. Bjørndal (2006b), “Effektivitetsmåling av regional- og 
distribusjonsnett – fellesmåling, kostnadsvariasjon og kalibrering”, SNF Report 38/06. 
Bjørndal, E., M. Bjørndal and T. Johnsen (2008), “Justeringsparameteren i 
inntektsrammereguleringen – vurdering av behov for endringer”, SNF Report 37/08. 
Dyson, R.G. and E. Thanassoulis (1988), “Reducing Weight Flexibility in Data 
Envelopment Analysis”, Journal of the Operational Research Society, 39/6, 563-576. 
Emrouznejad, A. (2005), “Measurement efficiency and productivity in SAS/OR”, 
Computers and Operations Research 32/7, 1665-1683. 
Herrero, I. and S. Pascoe (2002), “Estimation of Technical efficiency: a review of some 
of the stochastic frontier and DEA software”, Computers in Higher Education Economics 
Review (CHEER) 15/1. 
Hillier, F.S. and M.S. Hillier (2008), “Introduction to Management Science: A Modeling 
and Case Studies Approach with Spreadsheets”, McGraw-Hill Irwin. 
NVE (2006a), “Fastsettelse av kostnadsnorm. Økonomisk regulering av nettselskapene 
fra 2007”. Utkast per 6/6-2006. 
NVE (2006b), “Om fastsettelse av kostnadsnorm for 2007”. Notat av 4/12-2006. 
NVE (2007), “Varsel 2008 – Rundskriv om endringer i modellen”. Notat av 5/12-2007. 
NVE (2008), “Innføring av vektrestriksjoner i NVEs DEA-modell for distribusjonsnett”. 
Notat av 19/2-2008. 
SNF Report No 33/08 
 
74 
 
Olesen, O.B. and N.C. Petersen (1996), “A presentation of GAMS for DEA”, Computers 
and Operations Research 23/4, 323-339. 
Sarrico, C.S. and R.G. Dyson (2004), “Restricting virtual weights in data envelopment 
analysis”. European Journal of Operational Research 159, 17-34. 
Thanassoulis, E., R.G. Dyson, and M.J. Foster (1987), “Relative Efficiency Assessments 
Using Data Envelopment Analysis: An Application to Rates Departments”, Journal of the 
Operational Research Society 38/5, 397-411. 
Thanassoulis, E., M. Conceição Portela, and R. Allen (2004), “Incorporating Value 
Judgements in DEA”. In Handbook on Data Envelopment Analysis, ed. by William W. 
Cooper, Lawrence M. Seiford, and Joe Zhu, 99-138. 
Wong, Y.H.B. and J.E. Beasley (1990), “Restricting Weight Flexibility in Data 
Envelopment Analysis”, Journal of the Operational Research Society 41/9, 829-835. 
